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ABSTRACT 
This Article contends that American society needs to hold a genuine discussion 
about alternatives to current conceptions of marriage and family law jurisdiction.  
Specifically, the Article suggests that the civil government should consider ceding some of 
its jurisdictional authority over marriage and divorce law to religious communities that are 
competent and capable of adjudicating the marital rites and rights of their respective 
adherents.  There is historical precedent and preliminary movement toward this end -- both 
within and without the United States -- which might serve as the framework for further 
discussions. 
 Within the United States, the relatively new covenant marriage statutes of 
Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas provide a form of two-tiered marriage and divorce law.  
But there is even an earlier, and potentially more fulsome, example in New York’s get 
statutes.  New York’s laws derive from civil statutes that deal with specific problems raised 
by the intersection of civil law and Jewish law in marriage and divorce situations.  New 
York’s laws implicitly acknowledge that there are multiple understandings of the marital 
relationship already present among members of society.  These examples from within the 
United States lay the groundwork for a heartier discussion of the proper role of the state 
and other groups with respect to marriage and divorce law. 
 As part of that discussion, the Article contends that the United States should look 
outward, to the practices of other countries.  Several other nations – including India, 
Kenya, South Africa, and others – have ensconced multiple understandings of marriage in 
their own civil law.  That is, the state has (to varying degrees) ceded control and authority 
of marriage to other tribunals - or it has reified more than one understanding of marriage 
in its civil law.  Such multiple understandings are generally predicated upon religious 
grounds. These other nations and their comparative practices could serve as predecessors 
for new understandings of a more robust pluralism at American law. 
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MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE:
IDEAS AND INFLUENCES FROM  NEW YORK AND LOUISIANA 
TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many years now, American marriage and divorce law matters 
have fallen under the unitary jurisdiction of the several States.1 Not only 
has the civil authority obtained and retained full jurisdictional control, but 
the civil authority has also dictated that parties wishing to be married or 
divorced must do so under a unitary set of principles reified in state law. 2 
Recently, multi-tiered regimes have arisen in American law despite 
these tendencies toward unitary principles.  The most notable of these is the 
“covenant marriage movement,” which has found legislative success in 
three states to date.3 This limited legislative success has been far surpassed 
by voluminous commentary and reflection upon the notion of “covenant 
marriage laws.”4 One of the points of contention by critics of these 
 
1 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (“Long ago we 
observed that ‘the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent 
and child, belongs to the law of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’”) 
(citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890). 
2 Cf. Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law,
89 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001) (discussing the tendency at American law to create unitary 
systems under which all marriages must fall). 
3 Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901-906 (2006).  Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-801 to § 9-11-811 (2006).  Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2005).  See also infra 
Section II.A. 
4 See, e.g., Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Statute: A First Step Toward a More 
Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law? 47 EMORY L.J. 929 (1998).  See also COVENANT 
MARRIAGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (John Witte, Jr. & Eliza Ellison eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE] (using covenant marriage laws as a springboard for 
a series of chapters considering covenantal and contractual notions of marriage, especially 
within religious traditions); Daniel W. Olivas, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana 
Covenant Marriage Act: A Law Waiting to be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REV. 769 (2004) 
(contending that Tennessee should not adopt a “covenant marriage law” like that of 
Louisiana because it would be both ineffective and inefficient); Peter Hay, The American 
“Covenant Marriage” in the Conflict of Laws, 64 LA. L. REV. 43 (2003) (exploring the extent to 
which the limitations inherent in a covenant marriage are likely to be given effect in non-
covenant states and internationally); Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five 
Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169 (2003) (undertaking statistical analysis of couples 
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covenant marriage laws is that they create “two-tiered system[s] of 
marriage,”5 by allowing couples to choose whether to enter “a contract 
marriage, with minimal formalities of formation and attendant rights to no-
fault divorce … [or] a covenant marriage, with more stringent formation 
and dissolution rules.”6
A different kind of multi-tiered regime7 pre-dated the covenant 
marriage model, though.  While the nation’s first covenant marriage law 
came into effect in Louisiana in 1997, New York has recognized more than 
one model of marriage since 1983.8 It was in that year that New York 
passed the first get statute, seeking to alleviate the harshness of civil divorce 
upon Jewish women.9 While New York’s get laws are of a substantially 
different nature than the more recent covenant marriages laws, both sets of 
reforms move away from strictly unitary models and recognize greater 
pluralism in marriage and divorce law.  This is a salutary move, for the 
 
entering covenant marriages during its first five years in Louisiana); Chauncey E. Brummer, 
The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock? 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. 
Rev. 261 (2003) (discussing the introduction and rationale for covenant marriage laws, 
especially in Arkansas); Jeanne Louise Carrere, “It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again”; The Covenant 
Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701 (1998) 
(contending that Louisana’s covenant marriage law will not likely assist in lowering divorce 
rates, but will likely increase the litigiousness of divorce and increase the likelihood of 
spousal abuse); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and 
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998) (discussing and defending the origins and 
provisions of Louisiana’s covenant marriage law). 
5 Nichols, supra note 4, at 929.  See also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Marriage: Why a Second Tier 
Called Covenant Marriage?, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1999).  An example of such criticism 
may be found in Brummer, supra note 4, at 293 (By sanctioning covenant marriage, the 
state has in effect established two distinct categories of marriage, which may lead to the 
false impression that couples who enter one form are somehow ‘more married,’ and thus 
entitled to greater protection than those who enter into traditional marriage.”). 
6 John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 
4, at 1. 
7 As discussed below, this Article uses the terminology of “multi-tiered” in at least two 
ways: (1) to refer to systems that either have more than one possibility of marriage and 
divorce in their civil law; and (2) alternatively, to describe systems whereby jurisdiction 
over marriage and divorce matters is shared between different authorities.  Either way, 
such systems are multi-tiered because they inherently recognize and explicitly reify the 
fact that there is more than one possible understanding of marriage. 
8 The 1983 law (as amended substantially in 1984) may be found at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
253 (McKinney 1999).  The 1992 get act may be found at Amendments (Section 236B(5)(h) 
and 236B(6)(d)) to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B (McKinney 1999). 
9 See infra section III.B. 
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American tendencies toward uniform jurisdiction and uniform application  
of a single set of laws are neither historically mandated nor uniformly 
accepted by the international community.10 
Instead of unitary notions of jurisdiction and uniform application of 
a single law, the promise of a multi-tiered system holds substantial promise. 
At least two reasons present themselves as rationales for the changes to date 
in American law (evidenced by Louisiana and New York).  The first is the 
“sad and serious crisis of marriage in civil society,”11 evidenced by a wealth 
and welter of somber statistics about increasing divorce rates and the 
attendant effects on children and adult well-being.12 This was the driving 
force behind the covenant marriage laws, especially in Louisiana.13 The 
second is that there is more than one conception of marriage and divorce 
law in a plural society.14 This rationale was part of the impetus for the New 
York get statutes.15 
These two rationales can readily be expounded upon to suggest 
further pluralism in marriage and divorce law.  First, the statistics of 
increasing divorce rates and the attendant consequences of divorce can be 
expanded the encompass a host of ongoing debates about the proper and 
best way to “revitalize” the institution of marriage.16 Solutions range from 
the “abolition of marriage” (at least insofar as the civil state has any say in 
it)17 to increasing federalization of the definition of marriage18 to all manner 
 
10 See infra Section II and IV, respectively. 
11 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Marriage in Civil Society, 7 FAMILY AFFAIRS 1-5 (Spring 1996). 
12 See, e.g., Cynthia DeSimone, Covenant Marriage Legislation, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 391, 403-
05 (2002-03) (citing a multitude several statistics and sources); James Herbie DiFonzo, 
Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 877, 909-911 (2000) (same).  But see Robert T. 
Michael, An Economic Perspective on Sex, Marriage, and the Family in the Contemporary 
United States, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN 
LIFE 94-119 (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte, Jr., eds., 2005) (offering a more benign 
interpretation of statistics that purport to show a decline in the family). 
13 See generally Nichols, supra note 4. 
14 See Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. 
REV. 540 (2004).  See also AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS (2001). 
15 See IRVING A. BREITOWITZ, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLIGHT OF THE 
AGUNAH IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 179-85 (1993). 
16 See ALAN J. HAWKINS, LYNN D. WARDLE, & DAVID ORGON COOLIDGE, REVITALIZING THE 
INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2002). 
17 See, e.g., MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein ed., 
2005); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing 
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006); Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” 
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of things in between. 
Second, the confession that there is more than conception of the 
definition of marriage quite naturally expands to the recognition that we are 
a tremendously pluralistic society19 – especially with regard to religion.20 
We honor the best of our traditions when we recognize and reify our 
pluralistic nature21 – especially when we are careful to balance that 
pluralism with protections for women and children, with procedures to 
foster fairness, with policies that advance shared societal values of non-
discrimination, free exercise, parental control, and the like.22 
This Article proposes to take these twin rationales – the admitted 
changes in the cultural definition of marriage and divorce, and the 
pluralistic nature of our multi-cultural society – to further the conversation 
once again.  Rather than retaining our unitary and singular notions of 
marriage and divorce law, perhaps we should take seriously the possibility 
of multi-tiered marriage.  Perhaps we should allow for the possibility that 
marriage and divorce might have more than one form at law.23 And 
perhaps if we open the discussion to more than one understanding of 
marriage, we should acknowledge the thoughtful contributions and 
reflections by religious individuals and groups regarding marriage and 
divorce law.24 This Article posits that those religious groups have an 
 
Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006). 
18 See e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738C (2000). 
19 See SHACHAR, supra note 14, at 17-41 (discussing “the perils of multicultural 
accommodation,” and especially discussing the work of Will Kymlicka, Charles Taylor, 
and Iris Young). 
20 See Estin, supra note 14, at 555-56. 
21 Cf. Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in 
Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1693, 1734-50 (2005) (detailing the 
religiously plural nature of early Georgia). 
22 See Estin, supra note 14, at 556-58.  See also Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in 
Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992) (“One of law’s most basic duties is to 
protect citizens against harms done them by other citizens.  This means protecting people 
from physical harm, as the law of spouse and child abuse attempts to do, and from non-
physical harms, especially economic wrongs and psychological injuries.”). 
23 Cf. Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1784 (2005) (“[P]erhaps 
the state should similarly leave to individuals the choice of structure for their personal 
lives, even while it continues to offer its assistance when it is helpful in matters such as 
registration and default rules.”) 
24 See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT (1997) (discussing the history 
of Christian understandings of marriage); Nichols, supra note 4, at 979-88 (discussing 
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim religious structures and tribunals for addressing marriage 
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appropriate role to play in assisting the state to define the metes and 
bounds of the marital relationship. 
Thus, this Article proffers the concept of promoting multi-tiered 
marriage in our multi-cultural and pluralistic society.  It is unclear what 
form this multi-tiered marriage might take, and a variety of possibilities 
suggest themselves as alternatives.25 It is possible that American law will 
continue on its path of viewing marriage through a strict contractarian lens, 
such that reforms arise as a matter of enforcing the married parties’ 
agreement.26 It is also possible that some variation on the state laws of New 
York, Louisiana, and others might be a better alternative, wherein multiple 
(and maybe even competing) models of marriage are available to couples 
through the civil law itself.27 Or there may be other possibilities that are 
better for the American situation.  More critical than the precise form, 
though, is that the broader conversation include the possibility of the state 
ceding some of its jurisdictional control and hegemony.  A number of 
religious communities are competent and capable of adjudicating the 
marital rites and rights of their respective adherents, and this may well be 
better alternative than our current least common denominator notion of 
marriage law.28 
To advance the conversation down this path, this Article begins by 
looking backward, and then turns inward, and finally turns outward.  Thus, 
Section II describes the historical precedent for shared or competing 
jurisdiction, evidenced through the history of Western marriage law.  
Section III details the modern American precedent for recognizing that 
citizens may have varying conceptions of marriage, evidenced primarily in 
 
and divorce issues). 
25 See SHACHAR, supra note 14, at 88-113 (discussing a variety of “shared jurisdictional” 
models). 
26 See, e.g., Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing 
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 460, 474-75 (1998) (noting that current “marital law 
does not fit all marriages” and proposing to use the mechanism of contract law to allow 
couples to choose alternate forums, including religious forums, for jurisdiction of marital 
disputes).  See also MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 35-
42 (1993) (discussing how our society has shifted in its view of marriage from “status” to 
“contract”). 
27 I fully recognize that the notion of amalgamating civil and religious law presents a host 
of Establishment Clause concerns.  For present purposes, I assume that any such 
objections could be adequately addressed and overcome – although I admit that might 
not necessarily be the case in a fuller analysis. 
28 See Witte & Nichols, supra note 6, at 25. 
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the laws of Louisiana and New York.  Section IV delineates comparative 
precedents for multi-tiered marriages, evidenced in the laws of various 
countries in the international community (especially India, Kenya, and 
South Africa).  Finally, Section V draws these somewhat disparate strands 
together once again by elucidating their commonalities – namely their 
admission that there is more than one conception of marriage and divorce 
law.  It also elucidates the potential promise of multi-tiered marriage – that 
plural religious communities will be able to retain and further their own 
understandings of the goods and goals of marriage while the state will 
simultaneously be able to protect the most important rights of its citizens. 
 
II. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE LAW JURISDICTION 
The common lore of American law is that jurisdiction of marriage 
and divorce “has always been regulated by the civil authorities” – and 
primarily the various state civil authorities.29 While technically true, this 
broad claim elides the fact that the English common law “as received” in 
the various American colonies (and then states) reveals a more complex 
history and understanding of jurisdiction over both marital formation and 
dissolution. 30 Before turning directly to the history of marriage and 
divorce law in America that led to its current jurisdictional status, though, 
it is useful to retrace a selective history of such jurisdiction in Western 
society. 
Although unable to be pinned to a singular point in time, the 
Roman Catholic Church gradually assumed jurisdiction over matters of 
marriage and divorce law for believers.31 And as the Catholic Church 
 
29 See HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed. 
31 (1988). 
30 See GEORGE ELIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS, 3 vols. (1904).  
See also WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 24 (describing dual system of 
ecclesiastical structures and civil structures for marriage and divorce law in Europe prior 
to and during the Reformation); RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER (1988) (tracing the 
historical roots of divorce in Western society through modern times). 
31 See generally WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 16-41 (Chap. 1, 
describing“Marriage as Sacrament in the Roman Catholic Tradition”); PHILLIPS, supra 
note 30.  See generally CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BODY, EQUALITY IN THE 
FAMILY (2004) (discussing the rise of “rights” within medieval canon law).  
As Max Rheinstein has stated, the initial evolution of any external jurisdiction 
(whether civil or ecclesiastical) over marriage and divorce was initially an innovation, for 
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obtained increasing political strength and sway after the Papal Revolution 
in the thirteenth century, so too it increasingly began to claim sole 
jurisdiction over such matters.  To be fair, the Catholic Church was not 
beginning from scratch, but relied upon a system of ecclesiastical courts 
and a cadre of developing canon law.32 The Catholic Church believed 
marriage to be a sacrament – rather than merely a civil contract – and 
thought it naturally followed (especially when bolstered by claims from 
scripture) that marriage must be indissoluble.  To be fair, this 
indissolubility was ameliorated by (1) impediments restricting the entry 
into marriage; (2) the possibility of annulment; and (3) the possibility of 
separation a mensa et thoro (from bed and board) on proof of adultery, 
desertion, or cruelty.  But these factors did not (and could not) mask the 
fact that absolute divorce remained unavailable at canon law. 
The Protestant Reformation in the 16th century ushered in changes 
in marriage and divorce law just as it ushered in changes in so many other 
areas of life.  Most importantly for present purposes is that the reformers 
reconceived marriage as a social or civil estate more than a spiritual 
estate.33 At the same time, they placed jurisdiction of marriage and 
divorce in civic hands rather than clerical hands34 – partly as a default 
consequence of not having ecclesiastical courts of their own readily at 
hand, and partly as a natural consequence of their theology.35 But the 
Protestant Reformation on the Continent – including its shifting of 
jurisdiction to civil courts – did not follow the same path in England, the 
 
matters of marriage “had largely been outside the sphere of law.”  MAX RHEINSTEIN,
MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 17 (1972). 
32 See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 226-30 (1983) (describing the development and operations of the 
medieval canon law of marriage). 
33 See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 42-126 
34 See, e.g., JOHN WITTE, JR. LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE 
LUTHERAN REFORMATION 232-52 (2002) (discussing the “new civil law of marriage” in 
Lutheran theology and practice). 
35 See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 185 (2003) (“Luther’s strong view of 
the ‘worldly character of marriage led him to advocate not only the exclusive competence 
of secular political authorities to legislate the conditions of marriage but also the 
exclusive jurisdiction of secular courts to adjudicate marital causes.  Other Lutheran 
reformers, including Melanchthon, advocated a less extreme position, leaving to 
Protestant ecclesiastical tribunals, called consistories, the adjudication of marital 
causes.”). 
2006] MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE 9 
 
prime progenitor of American common law. 
In England, the Protestant Reformation led to a break between the 
Church of England and Rome – but there was not an accompanying break 
in doctrine regarding marriage and divorce.36 The result of the English 
Reformation thus continued to be union of church and state – including 
the retention of ecclesiastical courts, which exercised jurisdiction over 
matters of marriage and divorce until the 1850’s.  And in England – as in 
at canon law – there was no judicial right to absolute divorce (although 
relief could possibly be gained from Parliament).37 When the Puritans 
briefly took control of England in the mid 17th century they introduced the 
notion of civil marriage – but this was as short-lived as Cromwellian 
regime itself.38 Eventually, reform came to England in the mid-nineteenth 
century, with passage of legislation in 1835/36 that allowed marriages to 
be contracted under the supervision of a civil authority rather than only 
by ecclesiastical authorities,39 and then, finally, in 1857 by the famous 
Matrimonial Causes Act.40 That Act first allowed for absolute divorce 
(rather than only annulment or separation from bed and board), 
addressed matters of child custody, and shifted jurisdiction over issues of 
marriage and divorce law to the civil courts rather than the church courts. 
 (While the ecclesiastical courts were allowed to retain an internal body of 
canon law for voluntary use by its members, they no longer had any 
binding legal authority compared to the civil courts.)  This basic 
separation between civil and ecclesiastical courts has remained to this day 
in England, although churches continue to enjoy special rights regarding 
marital formation even after the state removed ecclesiastical control over 
 
36 As John Witte has described, Anglican thought moved toward conceiving of marriage 
as a “commonwealth” more than a “sacrament.”  See WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO 
CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 130-80.  But for jurisdictional purposes, this rather attenuated 
difference did not have a great deal of practical effect.  See, e.g., id. at 164 (“[M]arriage 
litigation in sixteenth and seventeenth-century England continued to look much as it had 
during the Middle Ages.”) (quoting R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN 
REFORMATION ENGLAND 69-70 (1992)). 
37 See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987 183-210 (1990); PHILLIPS,
supra note 30, at 227-41. 
38 See GEORGE ELIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS, 3 vols., I: 408-35 
(1907). 
39 6, 7 William IV c. 85 (1836). 
40 20 & 21 Vict. C. 85.  See also WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 
202-04; STONE, supra note 37, at 368-422; MARY ANN SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE AND 
THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND, 1850-1895 (1989). 
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dissolution issues.41 
An interesting parallel set of jurisdictional developments 
transpired in Jewish law at roughly the same period of time.  As set forth 
more fully below,42 Jewish law views marriage simultaneously as a 
private contract between two parties (with some degree of community 
involvement also) and also a covenant.43 Over time, Jewish law has 
produced a well-developed law regarding marriage and divorce and has 
sought to regulate the same by its own religious courts.  When Jews were 
living in predominantly Muslim territories in the middle ages, the Turkish 
authorities granted them a measure of autonomy over internal family law 
matters.44 This system involved the grant of semi-autonomy over certain 
legal matters by the governing civil authority (the Ottoman Empire) to 
certain religious communities – known as “millets.”45 While this semi-
autonomy was granted both the Christians and to Jews (both groups 
deemed “dhimmi” under the governing Islamic law), most literature has 
focused on the role of the Jewish communities in regulating their own 
internal affairs, especially with regard to family law.46 The millet system 
allowed for Jewish law to retain jurisdiction and effective control over 
marriage and divorce between Jews – and allowed Jewish scholars, rabbis, 
and courts to continue to shape and re-cast their conceptions of marriage 
and reify those into law without interference from the civil state.  This 
early recognition of Jewish-specific understandings of personal law is a 
healthy reminder that there is more than one reasonable understanding of 
 
41 See  Carolyn Hamilton, England and Wales, in FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE, 2d ed. (Carolyn 
Hamilton & Alison Perry, eds.) 95, 103, 113-14 (2002) (describing entrance into marriage 
via either civil or ecclesiastical means; also ascribing divorce jurisdiction solely to civil 
courts) (citing primarily to Marriage Act of 1949 and Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973). 
42 See infra Section III.B. 
43 See David Novak, Jewish Marriage: Nature, Covenant, and Contract, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 26; Michael J. Broyde, The Covenant-Contract Dialectic in 
Jewish Marriage and Divorce Law, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 53. 
44 See JACOB KATZ, TRADITION AND CRISIS: JEWISH SOCIETY AT THE END OF THE MIDDLE 
AGES (1961); see also H.A.R. GIBB & HAROLD BOWEN, ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST: A
STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION ON MOSLEM CULTURE IN THE NEAR EAST,
vol. 1, pt. II, 212. 
45 CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 12-13 (1982) (“Rather than a uniformly 
adopted system, it may be more accurately described as a series of ad hoc arrangements 
made over the years, which gave each of the major religious communities a degree of 
legal autonomy and authority with the acquiescence of the Ottoman state.”). 
46 See David Novak, Jewish Marriage and Civil Law: A Two-Way Street?, 68 GEO. WASH L. 
REV. 1059, 1068-69 (2000). 
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how law should govern individuals and communities respecting marriage 
and divorce. 
In the early days of the American republic, the colonists carried 
marriage and divorce laws with them from their origins.47 This meant 
that in colonies (such as those in the north) settled by Puritans – heirs of 
the Calvinist traditions – civil authorities addressed matters of marriage 
and divorce for early on; it was only after some time that the Puritans 
allowed any ministers to conduct weddings.48 But in Virginia, exactly the 
opposite was true:  A religious marriage ceremony, according to the rites 
of the Church of England, was prescribed by law up until the time of the 
Revolution.49 
There were similar disparities among the colonies respective 
divorce.  In New York, for example, divorce was within the power of the 
civil courts, due to the Reformation heritage. 50 But in the Southern 
colonies with their stronger Anglican heritage, divorce was disallowed.  
This derived both from the conception of marriage as an indissoluble 
union, and also from the fact that there were no ecclesiastical courts at all 
in the new land.  (There was a substantial possibility of appealing to the 
legislature for a divorce even if courts could not or would not grant 
divorces; this mirrored the practice of Parliamentary divorce in 
England.)51 
After the Revolution, regions on the frontier that had formerly been 
under Spanish control gradually came onto the American scene (including 
the Louisiana territory, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California).   Before 
become associated with the United States, these territories had been under 
the formal jurisdiction of Catholic bishops.  Residents of those territories 
were thus subject to Catholic canon law of marriage– including the notion 
 
47 GEORGE ELIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1907), II: 366 (“It is 
an established principle of jurisprudence that colonists setline in an uninhabited land take 
with them all the laws of the mother-country which are suited to their new 
circumstances.”). 
48 Id. at II: 138. 
49 Id. at II: 228. 
50 Id. at II: 376. 
51 See, e.g., id. at II: 349, III: 31.  See also NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF 
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 49 (2000) (“Not long after 1800, almost every state legislature 
entertained petitions for divorce and a dozen states stipulated grounds for divorce suits 
to be brought in the courts.  The legislative petition method faded as judicial divorce 
spread almost everywhere and most states expanded the statutory grounds.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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of indissoluble marriage, but some relief via annulment.  To be sure, the 
law on the books and the law in action were not always in harmony given 
the realities of daily life and existence in sparsely populated lands, often 
far away from priests, bishops, and ecclesiastical courts.52 When these 
territories came under control of the United States, marriage and divorce 
law was quickly shifted to the civil authorities. 
Collectively, this very short overview highlights the notion that 
jurisdictional authority over matters of marriage and divorce has rested – 
at various times and places – with civil authorities, religious authorities, or 
both.  And the lines have not always been clear and uniform.  This 
counsels us to tread cautiously in modern times when we presume that all 
marriage and divorce must be singular and solely under the jurisdiction of 
the state alone.  Further, the historical precedent gives us reason not to be 
surprised by more recent developments and changes in state laws. 
 
III.  DOMESTIC MOVEMENT TOWARD MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE 
One seminal reason that civil and various religious authorities 
shared (and sometimes competed for) jurisdiction over marriage and 
divorce matters is because there was not only one understanding of 
marriage.  This should be unsurprising as an historical matter, since 
current debates about same-sex marriage are also premised upon 
fundamentally competing notions of the goods and goals of marriage. 
It is one thing to acknowledge that there are varying 
understandings of marriage (as contract, as sacrament, as spiritual estate, 
as civil union, and others); it is quite another to embody more than one 
understanding in the law.  Somewhat surprisingly (given the paucity of 
commentary on the issue), there are already several ways that matters of 
marriage and divorce are “tiered” – or governed differently depending 
who is seeking governance.  For example, one could adduce the examples 
of the new “domestic partnership” or “civil union” arrangements as 
indicative of a recognition of more than one legally cognizable level of 
commitment between two individuals.53 
Another variant of these multi-tiered jurisdictional schemes are the 
 
52 See generally Hans W. Baade, The Form of Marriage in Spanish North America, 61 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (1975). 
53 See Case, supra note 23, at 1773-77 (surveying various state law examples, including 
California, New Jersey, Vermont, Connecticut, and others).  See also William C. Duncan, 
Survey of Interstate Recognition of Quasi-Marital Statuses, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 617 (2005). 
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regulation of family law issues by various tribal courts of American Indian 
tribes.  While “enormous uncertainties exist as to the contours of a tribe’s 
civil jurisdiction,” the tribal court’s civil jurisdiction “may be at its 
strongest” in the realm of family law (which tribes have traditionally 
enjoyed a sovereign role).54 This is especially true with regard to child 
custody determinations,55 but there are also cases that indicate that 
jurisdiction over divorce or marital separation issues may lie with the 
tribal court.56 That the civil state shares (and cedes?) jurisdiction – albeit 
with another “sovereign” entity – in tribal courts underscores that there 
are already different systems of marriage and divorce depending who is 
involved.57 
But still other, and bolder, examples of pluralism within the civil 
law itself also come to mind.  The “covenant marriage” laws of Arizona, 
Arkansas, and Louisiana58 ensconce more than one conception of marriage 
and divorce law within a single state.  And while these laws are often 
hailed as the nation’s first two-tiered laws, there is a strong argument that 
New York laid the groundwork some fourteen years before Louisiana 
through passage of New York’s statutes regulating Jewish divorce.59 
Accordingly, it is fruitful to discuss both the more recent “covenant 
marriage laws” of Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana – and then to 
compare that with a detailed discussion of the New York experience. 
 
54 Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. 
REV. 577, 594-95 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Fisher v. District Ct, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (holding that a tribe had exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine custody of an Indian child in a dispute between the child’s 
Indian mother and her Indian foster mother).  See also Barbara Ann Atwood, Changing 
Definitions of Tribal Power Over Children, 83 MINN. L. REV. 927 (1999); Barbara Ann 
Atwood, Fighting Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 
UCLA L. REV. 1051 (1989). 
56 See, e.g.,Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 
1997) (exercising divorce and custody jurisdiction over dispute between trial member and 
non-Indian). 
57 A survey of Indian family law jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article, but it 
would likely yield conclusions that bolster the descriptive and normative analysis herein. 
58 Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901-906 (2006).  Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-801 to § 9-11-811 (2006).  Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2005). 
59 See, e.g., Broyde, supra note 43, at 67 (“One could claim that New York state not only 
had the first covenant marriage law, but the first two such laws – the 1983 Jewish divorce 
law and the 1992 Jewish divorce law, each with a different approach to Jewish 
marriage.”). 
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A. Covenant Marriage Laws (Louisiana, Arkansas, and Arizona) 
 
Covenant marriage laws have three key features: (1) mandatory 
premarital counseling that stresses the seriousness of marriage and its 
attendant lifelong commitment; (2) the premarital signing of a legal 
document (a Declaration of Intent) requiring couples to make “all 
reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, including marriage 
counseling” in the event of difficulties; and (3) the provision of limited 
grounds for divorce.60 These laws provide state-sanctioned, alternate, 
voluntary forms of marriage from the typical easy-entry and no-fault 
divorce regimes.  The end result of such laws is that couples entering 
covenant marriages have heightened entrance requirements and more 
limited possibilities for exit.61 The theory behind this movement that 
premarital counseling, combined with an advance commitment to 
heightened efforts to make the marriage “work” even in the face of 
difficulty and the knowledge that covenant marriages are more difficult to 
exit, will lead to stronger marriages.  And strengthening the institution of 
marriage in this way will help “lessen the problem of divorce.”62 
The nation’s first such covenant marriage law was passed in 
Louisiana in 1997.63 Similar ideas had previously been floated in popular 
and academic literature,64 and had been introduced in a handful of state 
legislatures,65 but had found insufficient traction.  In Louisiana, newly-
elected State Representative Tony Perkins worked with LSU Law 
Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht to draft and introduce a covenant 
marriage law to “strengthen the family” by turning a “culture of divorce” 
into a “culture of marriage.”66 After a series of committee hearings and a 
 
60 See Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Modern American Covenant Marriage Movement: Its 
Origins and Its Future, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 239-40, 244-47. 
61 Cf. WITTE, FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 217-28 (advocating that 
there must a level of comparability in marital formation and dissolution rules). 
62 Spaht, Modern American Covenant Marriage, supra note 60, at 243. 
63 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (2005).  For a history of the passage of the law, see Spaht,
Modern American Covenant Marriage, supra note 60, at 240-43; Nichols, supra note 4, at 943-
46. 
64 See Christopher Wolfe, The Marriage of Your Choice, FIRST THINGS 37-41 (Feb. 1995); 
Amitai Etzioni, How to Make Marriage Matter, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 76. 
65 See Nichols, supra note 4, at 943-44 (citing to Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Washington). 
66 Audio tape of Tony Perkins, Louisiana State Representative (and sponsor of 
Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law), Hearings before Senate Committee on Judiciary A 
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few amendments, the legislature passed the act and Louisiana Governor 
Mike Foster signed it into law in mid-1997.67 
Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law introduced a fundamental 
change in traditional marriage law in the state, for it provided couples a 
choice as to whether to take the regular marriage option or the “covenant 
marriage” alternative.  A covenant marriage is defined as pertaining to 
one man and one woman who agree with the proposition that “the 
marriage between them is a lifelong relationship,” and that marriage vows 
may be broken only under extreme circumstances.68 The covenant 
marriage law used the previously existing law of marriage and divorce as 
a sort of default minimum system for marriages: couples must explicitly 
choose to make their marriage (and thus potential divorce) conform to the 
covenant marriage standards. 
There are both heightened entrance and exit requirements for 
couples entering covenant marriages.  The heightened entrance 
requirements include premarital counseling and submission of a 
Declaration of Intent.  First, the couple must jointly attend premarital 
counseling by a “priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of 
Friends, any clergyman of any religious sect, or a marriage counselor.”69 
This counseling must include a discussion of the nature of marriage as 
understood by the Covenant Marriage Law, a discussion of the legal 
recourse(s) available to the parties should marital difficulties arise, and a 
discussion of the obligation to seek marital counseling prior to seeking 
legal recourse in the event of marital difficulties.70 The counselor must 
also provide the couple with a copy of the informational pamphlet by the 
attorney general’s office detailing the rights and responsibilities in 
covenant marriages.71 
(June 10, 1997) (on file with author). 
67 See Spaht, Modern American Covenant Marriage, supra note 60, at 240-43. 68 The statutory definition provides: 
A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one female who 
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong relationship.  
Parties to a covenant marriage have received counseling emphasizing the nature 
and purposes of marriage and the responsibilities thereto.  Only when there has 
been a complete and total breach of the marital covenant commitment may the 
non-breaching party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally 
recognized. 
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 § 272(A) (2004). 69 Id. at § 273(A)(2)(a). 70 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 § 273(A)(2)(a) (2004). 71 Id. at § 273(A)(2)(b). 
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Following the counseling – but before the marriage ceremony – the 
parties must sign a Declaration of Intent.72 This document contains the 
content of the parties’ covenant, including their commitment to one 
another, states their understanding of the nature of marriage (as “a 
covenant between a man and a woman who agree to live together as 
husband and wife for so long as they both shall live”), affirms that 
premarital counseling has occurred, and reiterates that the two parties 
understand the legal implications of entering into this kind of union.73 
Consonant with that understanding, the parties commit themselves to 
seek counseling during marriage if difficulties should arise.74 
Accompanying the higher threshold of entrance to a covenant 
marriage, it is correspondingly difficult to exit a covenant marriage.  In 
“regular” marriages in Louisiana couples may divorce for adultery, 
conviction of a felony, or living separate and apart for six months (180 
 
72 Newlyweds are not the only persons who can obtain the state of covenant marriage; the 
law also has potential retroactive effect.  Couples who are already married may elect to 
enter voluntarily into a covenant marriage—thus “upgrading” the status of their 
previously “regular” marriage.  The married couple must jointly execute a letter of intent 
to designate their marriage a covenant marriage and to subject themselves to the laws 
pertaining thereto. Id. at § 309(A)(1). 73 The statute provides that the recitation must include the following attestation in full: 
A COVENANT MARRIAGE 
We do solemnly declare that marriage is a covenant between a man and a 
woman who agree to live together as husband and wife for so long as they both 
may live.  We have chosen each other carefully and disclosed to one another 
everything which could adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage.  
We have received premarital counseling on the nature, purposes, and 
responsibilities of marriage.  We have read the Covenant Marriage Act, and we 
understand that a Covenant Marriage is for life.  If we experience marital  
difficulties, we commit ourselves to take all reasonable efforts to preserve our 
marriage, including marital counseling. 
With full knowledge of what this commitment means, we do hereby declare 
that our marriage will be bound by Louisiana law on Covenant Marriages and 
we promise to love, honor, and care for one another as husband and wife for the 
rest of our lives. 
Id. at § 273(A)(1).  This last clause purportedly operates as a choice of law clause, binding 
the parties to Louisiana law.  See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the Law of Conflict of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085 (1999).  But see Hay, supra note 4. 
74 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 § 273(A)(1) (2004).  See also Katherine Shaw Spaht, Covenant 
Marriage Seven Years Later: Its As Yet Unfulfilled Promise, 65 LA. L. REV. 605, 614 (2005) 
(discussing the obligation of the parties to seek resolution while still married, unless there 
has been physical or sexual abuse). 
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days).75 In covenant marriages, though, couples no longer have the option 
of unilateral divorce after a 180 days’ separate; instead, they must wait at 
least two years.76 Other alternatives are available to parties in covenant 
marriages who have undergone the required marital counseling but have 
not lived apart for two years without reconciliation, such that divorce is 
obtainable upon proof of: (1) adultery of the other spouse; (2) the other 
spouse’s commission of a felony and subsequent sentencing to “death or 
imprisonment at hard labor;” (3) abandonment of the matrimonial 
domicile for a period of one year (with a refusal to return) by the other 
spouse; (4) physical or sexual abuse directed toward the spouse seeking 
the divorce or a child of one of the spouses; (5) the two year separation; 
and (6) separation for at least one year from the date of a judgment for 
separation from bed and board.77 
Non-guilty spouses in covenant marriages may also benefit from a 
legal alternative other than divorce: separation from bed and board for 
egregious cases (including habitual intemperance of the spouse),78 
although counseling is still required before such a separation may be 
granted.79 Separation from bed and board does not “dissolve the bond of 
matrimony,” since the separated spouses may not marry again in the 
interim.80 
Less than one year after Louisiana’s passage of its covenant 
marriage law, Arizona became the second state to adopt a covenant 
marriage law.81 And in 2001 Arkansas joined these two by passing its 
own covenant marriage law.82 “All three statutes contain the familiar 
three components of mandatory premarital counseling, a legally binding 
agreement to take reasonable steps to preserve the marriage, and 
 
75 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts 102, 103 § 1  (2004). 
76 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9 § 307(A)(5) (2004). 77 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. at § 307(A).  Note that § 307(A)(6)(b) (concerning divorce when a 
minor child is involved) has another variable.  The period of separation after judgment of 
separation from bed and board increases to one year and six months if a minor child is 
involved, unless the basis of the judgment of separation from bed and board was for 
abuse of the child or the spouse seeking the divorce.  In the latter instance, a divorce may 
be granted if the spouses have been living apart without reconciliation for only one year.  Id. at § 307(A)(6)(b). 78Id. at § 307(B). 79Id. Counseling is not required if the other spouse is abusive.  Id. at §307(D) (as added 
by 2004 La. Acts. No. 490). 80Id. at § 309(A)(1). 
81 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901-906 (2006).   
82 ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 to § 9-11-811 (2006).  See also Brummer, supra note 4. 
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restrictive grounds for divorce.”83 Arizona allows for greater 
permissibility in grounds for divorce under its covenant marriage law, 
notably including that the state can grant a divorce in a covenant marriage 
upon proof of mutual consent by both husband and wife.84 The grounds 
for divorce in Arkansas much more closely track those in Louisiana.85 
Aside from these two additional states that have joined Louisiana, 
attempts to secure covenant marriage laws have failed in several states, 
although they continue to be introduced on a regular basis.86 
While the efficacy of covenant marriage laws can be (and indeed is) 
debated, the very advent of such laws is notable for their re-introduction 
of more than one model of marriage in the law.  More precisely, these 
covenant marriage laws enact two-tiered systems for marriage and 
divorce law.  This shift away from a unitary legal model of marriage and 
divorce law is a salutary move.  Indeed, it represents a virtual sea-change 
at modern American law by promulgating multiple, co-existing models of 
marriage within a single state at the one time.87 But the commentary to 
date is relatively silent on this fundamental shift.  And just as the 
literature focuses on the virtues or vices of the “covenant marriage” 
option – rather than on the fact that there is an option – the literature also 
overlooks the fact that a multiple-tiered system of marriage in New York 
that pre-dated the Louisiana scheme by almost fifteen years. 
 
83 Spaht, Modern American Covenant Marriage Movement, supra note 60, at 247. 
84 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3601 (2006). 
85 See Spaht, Modern American Covenant Marriage Movement, supra note 60, at 248-49. 
86 See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 1228 (2006); Ind. H.B. 1210 (2006) and Ind. S.B. 19 (2006); Ky. H.B. 242 
(2006); Miss. H.B. 467 (2006); N.C. H.B. 1664 (2005). 
87 Of course, the long ensconced notion that substantive family law is fundamentally a 
matter of state (as opposed federal) concern already introduces the possibility of 
multiple, co-existing models of marriage within the United States – which leads to the 
very examples herein of Louisiana, New York, and the like.  These inter-state differences 
already lead to quite interesting and difficult situations regarding conflicts of law.  See, 
e.g., Peter Hay, The American ‘Covenant Marriage’ in the Conflict of Laws, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 4, at 294. 
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B. New York’s Get Statutes 
 
New York’s get statutes88 have generated wide discussion in legal 
literature, but the discussion has been limited to constitutional analysis 
(with most commentators believing the New York statutes to be 
unconstitutional).89 What has not been discussed in the literature is the 
fundamental change in family law wrought by the get statutes.90 And 
what becomes apparent upon closer investigation is that the get statutes 
introduce major change in American family law by acknowledging that 
there may be more than one jurisdictional claim upon a married couple 
and that there may be more than only the singular conception of marriage 
typically promulgated by the state.  (It is this latter principle that forms a 
key insight picked up by the covenant marriage statutes, discussed 
above.)  
 
1. Jewish law of marriage and divorce. 
Although not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the get statutes, 
Jewish law undergirds the rationale of the get statutes and provides their 
entire raison d’être.91 Thus, a general understanding of the principles of 
 
88 N.Y. Dom Rel. Law §§ 236B, 253 (McKinney 1999). 
89 “There is no express reference to Jews in the statute in an attempt to avoid the 
appearance of violating the constitutional separation of church and state, but nevertheless 
it is highly questionable whether the statute is constitutional.”  ELLIOT N. DORFF &
ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 547 (1988).  For 
other examples of the voluminous literature, see, e.g., BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 179-
203; Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance 
of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 810-39 (1998); Ilene H. 
Barshay, The Implications of the Constitution’s Religion Clauses on New York Family Law, 40 
HOW. L.J. 205 (1996); Patti A. Scott, Comment, New York Divorce Law and the Religion 
Clauses: An Unconstitutional Exorcism of the Jewish Get Laws, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1117 
(1996); Jodi M. Solovy, Comment, Civil Enforcement of Jewish Marriage and Divorce: 
Constitutional Accommodation of a Religious Mandate, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 493 (1996); Paul 
Finkelman, New York’s Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUMBIA J. OF LAW AND 
SOC. PROBLEMS 55 (1993); Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha,
Contract, and the First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312 (1992). 
90 Cf.  Lisa Zornberg, Beyond the Constitution:  Is the New York Get Legislation Good Law?, 15 
PACE L. REV. 703 (1995) (looking at the practical effects of the get statutes and their effect 
on and acceptance by Jewish communities, but failing to address the fundamental 
changes in family law ushered in by the get statutes). 
91 “Although the statute [§ 253] is phrased in ostensibly neutral language, its avowed 
purpose is to curb what has been described as the withholding of Jewish religious 
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Jewish law on marriage and divorce is a necessary framework for 
understanding the get statutes. 
According to halacha,92 a marriage may be terminated in only two 
ways: through the death of a spouse or by the granting of a get.93 The first 
method seems clear enough on its face, but was particularly troublesome 
in earlier times -- when methods of communication and investigation 
were much more primitive -- when one spouse (usually the husband) was 
traveling and failed to return.  A ready example comes from times of 
warfare, when the husband would go off to battle and fail to return for a 
long period of time; the wife and Jewish law had to find a way to address 
the tension between waiting indefinitely for a husband to return who may 
be deceased and obtaining a divorce and remarrying with the possibility 
remaining that the missing husband may yet return.  Jewish law 
developed a series of detailed regulations governing such cases.94 
The second method of terminating a marriage is a divorce.95 Under 
Jewish law, the regulations regarding the giving and receiving of a get 
govern divorces.96 A get is a formal written document signifying and 
stating the husband’s desire to divorce.97 As elaborated by the Talmud, 
 
divorces, despite the entry of civil divorce judgments, by spouses acting out of 
vindictiveness or applying economic sanction.  See Governor’s Memorandum of 
Approval, McKinney’s 1983 Session Laws of New York, pp. 2818, 2819.  The statute seeks 
to provide a remedy for the ‘tragically unfair’ situation presented where a Jewish 
husband refuses to sign religious documents needed for a religious divorce.”  Alan D. 
Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, 1999 Main Volume, MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS 
OF NEW YORK ANNOTATED, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253, C253:1. 
92 “Halacha is the entire corpus of Jewish law.”  BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 3 n.5.  See 
also id. at Appendix D. 
93 See M. MIELZINER, THE JEWISH LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN ANCIENT AND 
MODERN TIMES, AND ITS RELATION TO THE LAW OF THE STATE 108 (1884, repr. 1987). 
94 See discussion and sources in id. at 108-114. 
95 See generally RACHEL BIALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW: THE ESSENTIAL TEXTS, THEIR 
HISTORY, AND THEIR RELEVANCE FOR TODAY 70-101 (1984). 
96 The following discussion applies most strictly to Orthodox and Conservative Judaism, 
as Reform Judaism did away with the get requirement in 1869.  See J. David Bleich, Jewish 
Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REV.
201, 232 n. 96 (1984).  Many Reform rabbis encourage the use of the get, though, because 
it may avoid complications for the parties later.  See sources cited in Breitowitz, supra 
note 89, at 315 n.5 and 270 n. 256. 
97 Jewish law founds the origin of the get is mentioned in the Torah: “A man takes a wife 
and possesses her.  She fails to please him because he finds something obnoxious about 
her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her away from his 
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the get has clear gender implications in Jewish divorces.   It is the sole role 
of the husband to give (or withhold) a get; the role of the wife is limited to 
receiving the get. Further, a husband may give a get and divorce his wife 
even against her will, “but a husband divorces only from his own free 
will.”98 The power of the husband in marital relationships was furthered 
by the development in Jewish law of the husband’s right to divorce his 
wife on almost any grounds at all, no matter how frivolous.  Conversely, a 
wife’s right to sue for divorce is much more limited,99 but nonetheless 
turns upon the husband’s willingness to issue a get to finalize the 
divorce.100 (The issuance of a get is a private act, with no need for judicial 
involvement – but a rabbi or rabbinical tribunal is “invariably” present to 
ensure adherence to procedural formalities.101)
Because the issuance of the get is the sole right of the husband, a 
difficult situation develops when a recalcitrant husband refuses -- for 
whatever reason -- to issue a get to his wife.  Without a get, a Jewish 
woman cannot remarry according to Jewish law and she becomes an 
agunah, “a chained woman.”102 If the woman remarries without a proper 
Jewish divorce, she is not only not married to the putative second 
husband, but she is never allowed to marry that man because “he is her 
guilty, adulterous partner.”103 Also of great significance at Jewish law is 
that any children born to an agunah who remarries without receiving a get 
are considered bastards, mamzerim. These children are “illegitimate” 
religiously (though not necessarily civilly) and carry that status with them 
throughout their life.  The children are effectively excluded from 
 
house . . . .”  Deut. 24:1 (JPS translation). 
98 IRWIN H. HAUT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 18 (1983) (quoting BABYLONIAN 
TALMUD, YEVAMOT, 112b). 
99 See MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH 
LAW 15-27 (2001) (summarizing historical rights and reasons to divorce at Jewish law). 
100 See HAUT, supra note 98, at 18-25.  Jewish law places only two extreme exceptions on a 
husband’s right to divorce according to the Torah: when a man rapes an unmarried 
woman and when a newly married groom falsely accuses his bride of having had sexual 
relations with a stranger after a certain marital status has already been obtained.  In the 
former case, the man must marry the woman if she consents – and then may not divorce 
her.  In the latter case, the false accuser is enjoined from ever divorcing his wife. See id. at 
18-19. 
101 BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 6. 
102 See BROYDE, supra note 99, at 15 (“Jewish law defines an agunah as a woman who 
wants to be divorced, is entitled to a get, but is not receiving one.”). 
103 DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 89, at 524. 
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organized Judaism, as they are not even allowed to marry into Judaism for 
ten generations.104 Unlike women, men are not nearly as affected by the 
failure to give a get. A man who remarries without a Jewish divorce has 
not committed adultery, but has only violated a rabbinic decree 
mandating monogamy; he is nonetheless considered married to his 
second wife and his children are legitimate.105 
Jewish law has made several efforts to protect the interests of 
women, who lack power in divorce cases because of the husband’s sole 
right to issue the get. These include standardizing the get process to 
include a host of formal and technical rules which should, in part, prevent 
a husband from too hastily issuing a get.106 Another protection for the 
wife comes at the front end of marriage rather then the back end.  When a 
couple marries, they must sign a ketubah (“writing”) that denotes certain 
obligations -- of money and provision for the physical needs of the wife -- 
that a husband must undertake in the event of a divorce.107 
But these methods do not address the situation of a recalcitrant 
husband who refuses to issue a get, though.  To partially combat this 
problem, Jewish law developed a legal fiction that in certain circumstances 
a properly convened Jewish court acting within its jurisdiction may 
compel the husband to issue the get.108 Although a get must be issued by 
the free will of the husband, the legal fiction is that the husband intends to 
act in accordance with Jewish law and duress may thus be used to compel 
him to do what his true disposition wishes to do.109 Traditionally, the 
range of various social pressures exerted on the recalcitrant husband to 
encourage the issuance of a get spanned from public declarations in the 
synagogue to social excommunication and banishment from the 
community.  These pressures met moderate success when Jewish 
 
104 See ADRIENNE BAKER, THE JEWISH WOMAN IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 57 (1993); DORFF 
& ROSETT, supra note 89, at 524. 
105 See DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 89, at 524-25 (“A man is guilty of adultery in Jewish 
law only if he has intercourse with a woman who is married to someone else.”). 
106 See HAUT, supra note 98, at 27-41. 
107 See MIELZINER, supra note 93, at 85-89. 
108 It is important that this be a properly convened Jewish court (Beth Din) acting within 
its own jurisdiction, for duress upon a husband by a secular court is never proper and 
may never comport with Jewish law regarding a freely given get. See HAUT, supra note 
98, at 24.  For further commentary on the important restriction that issuance of a get must 
not be invalidly compelled, see BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 20-40 (discussing the get 
meusah: a bill of divorce granted under compulsion or duress). 
109 See generally HAUT, supra note 98,  at 23-25. 
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communities were “fairly independent entities with virtually complete 
control over their internal affairs.”110 But in an age of increasing 
technology and mobility and decreasing isolation for most Jewish 
communities, these methods rarely effect the desired result.  When 
coupled with the fact that the circumstances when duress are proper are 
quite limited, this legal fiction results in only moderate protection for 
women. 
 
2. Effect of dual systems of marriage and divorce.
Important to the above discussion is that Jewish law does not 
recognize the validity of civil divorce.111 This means that an observant 
Jew must obtain a Jewish religious divorce before he or she remarries.  
Until relatively recent times, any conflict between Jewish law and civil law 
on marriage and divorce was minimal since many civil states delegated 
authority over these aspects of family law to the religious authorities in 
some fashion.112 But in recent times, the Jewish law problems regarding 
the voluntary giving of a get and the agunah problem have become 
exacerbated due to a dual law of marriage and divorce. 
The exclusive shift to exclusive civil court jurisdiction of divorce 
law “raised the spectre, horrid indeed from the point of view of Jewish 
law, that a Jewish couple could be deemed to be divorced by the laws of 
the state or country in which they lived, and yet remain married in the 
eyes of Jewish law, unless a get was given and accepted.”113 In America, 
the exclusive civil court jurisdiction over divorce resulted in a dual law of 
marriage and divorce, with the civil authorities (the states) maintaining 
full jurisdiction over marriage and divorce and Jewish law resisting 
 
110 Michael S. Berger & Deborah E. Lipstadt, Women in Judaism from the Perspective of 
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN JUDAISM: CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 77, 101 (Michael J. Broyde & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1998).  The range of social 
pressures exerted on recalcitrant husbands includes a certain level of permissible 
corporal punishment in some instances: “force is applied to [the recalcitrant husband] 
until he says, ‘I consent.’”  Bava Batra, 47b-48a, in DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 89, at 527-
28. 
111 See DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 89, at 520 (noting the limitation on the principle of dina 
demalkhuta dina (the law of the land is the law) to exclude coverage of divorces executed 
in non-Jewish courts); BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 8 (“[J]ust as a civil divorce has no 
validity in the eyes of religious law, a religious divorce is not recognized civilly.”). 
112 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.  See also BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 
164-72 and sources cited therein. 
113 HAUT, supra note 98, at 59. 
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surrendering its jurisdiction over the same.  The result for Jewish couples 
is an obligation to abide by the regulations of both civil and religious 
authorities.114 
In marital formation, the dual law of marriage is not a great 
obstacle, as most states permit marriage by either secular or religious 
officials.  Most rabbis, empowered by the state to effectuate a civil 
marriage and by the religious tradition to effectuate a religious marriage, 
will not perform a religious ceremony without meeting the requirements 
of the civil marriage, and vice versa.  There can never be a Jewish 
marriage without a civil marriage, and a civil marriage not in accord with 
Jewish law may nonetheless be later brought under the aegis of Jewish 
law, and so there are no serious jurisdictional conflicts in regard to 
marriage.115 
Marital dissolution, however, presents serious jurisdictional 
difficulties.  While the agunah problem is difficult enough within the 
Jewish tradition, it becomes even more extreme and exaggerated when 
civil authorities govern divorce – for if a man refuses to give a get to his 
wife, he nonetheless may obtain a civil divorce by meeting the proper civil 
requirements.  Because Jewish law does not recognize the validity of civil 
divorces, the couple would thus remain religiously married even after 
obtaining a civil divorce.  Only by complying with the strictures of Jewish 
law regarding the get procedure may a couple be divorced religiously.  
This anomaly allows either party to remarry according to civil law, even 
though to do so for the woman would mean that she was committing 
adultery and all children from the second union would be bastards.  The 
consequences for the man are not nearly so dire, for even though his 
actions would be frowned upon by Jewish law, he would not be 
committing adultery nor would any offspring be illegitimate.116 This 
disparity alone decreases the incentive for a man to issue a get to his wife, 
or else to condition issuance of the get upon certain conditions regarding 
 
114 See BROYDE, supra note 99, at 29-32.  Broyde states that “[n]ever before the twentieth 
century has the Jewish community been subject to a system of compulsory civil marriage 
and divorce law, and this requirement has had a major impact on both the contours of the 
agunah problem and the contours of the solutions to it.”  Id. at 30.  While I have been 
unable to discover support for such a strong statement (and such late development) of 
the duality, there is no doubt that the problem of the dual systems has become 
exaggerated after the advent of no-fault divorce. 
115 See DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 89, at 524. 
116 See BROYDE, supra note 99, at 29-31. 
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custody or property distribution.  In effect, then, “[t]he importance of the 
get to Jewish women has made it an ideal tool for blackmail.”117 
Examples abound of abuses of the inequitable bargaining position 
of husband and wife due to the sole power of the man to issue the get and 
thus effectuate a religious divorce.  For example, one recalcitrant husband 
agreed to issue a get only after receiving $15,000 and a promise that his 
former wife would not press assault charges against him after he broke 
her leg.118 Other examples include a woman who mortgaged her house 
for $120,000 to pay the amount demanded by her husband for issuance of 
a get, a woman who was forced to drop charges against her husband for 
sexually abusing their daughter so that she might obtain a get, and the 
increasing demands of a recalcitrant husband who asked for $100,000 
(which he received), then $1 million, and then his wife’s father’s pension -- 
in addition to demanding full custody of the children.119 
The sordid tales of recalcitrant husbands with excessive demands 
in return for issuing a get, when combined with the number of recalcitrant 
husbands who simply refuse to issue a get under any conditions, has made 
the time ripe for reform.  Many rabbis, who attribute the rise in agunot to 
recently changed conditions (both in the precedence of civil law over 
religious law and the ineffectiveness of religious societal sanction), are 
ready to search for new solutions to the problem of the agunot.120 
Prospects for reform have come both from within the religious law and 
from outside of it. 
In 1954, the Conservative scholar Saul Lieberman sought to add a 
new clause to the ketubot, the marriage contract.121 This new clause 
effectively was to act as an arbitration agreement between the parties; the 
Beth Din was named as the arbitrator if the parties desired to dissolve the 
 
117 Shauna van Praagh, Book Review of Religion and Culture in Canadian Family Law, by 
John Tibor Syrtash, 38 MCGILL L.J. 233, 143 (1993). 
118 See Peter Hellman, Playing Hard to Get, in WOMEN IN CHAINS: A SOURCEBOOK ON THE 
AGUNAH 15, 16-17 (Jack Nusan Porter ed., 1995). 
119 See Irwin Cotler, Jewish NGOs and Religious Human Rights: A Case Study, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN JUDAISM, supra note 110, at 165, 264.; Zornberg, supra note 90, at 718-20. 
120 See Berger & Lipstadt, supra note 110, at 104 (“[T]he fact that a large number of agunot 
have appeared only recently is evidence that the existing system is sufficiently viable.  
What these Orthodox leaders bemoan is the changing conditions that have rendered 
traditional methods of coping with this problem essentially useless.”). 
121 See SHLOMO RISKIN, WOMEN AND JEWISH DIVORCE: THE REBELLIOUS WIFE, THE AGUNAH 
AND THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO INITIATE DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW, A HALAKHIC SOLUTION 
137 (1989). See also HAUT, supra note 98, at  63-65; Breitowitz, supra note 89, at 361-70. 
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marriage in the future.122 The hope was that this clause would be 
halachically and civilly enforceable as an arbitration agreement as well as 
a religious agreement between the parties to submit to the authority of the 
Beth Din. Orthodox rabbis reacted negatively to this Conservative 
proposal on halachic grounds, for they asserted that the agreement to pay 
an indeterminate sum of money is impermissible in Jewish law.  Further, 
they contended that the ketubah itself, as an integral part of the Jewish 
marriage ceremony, is not a civil document but a religious document, 
which is by its nature excluded from civil judicial review.123 
The arguments about the civil enforceability of the Lieberman clause were 
put to the test in a 1983 New York case, Avitzur v. Avitzur.124 In a 4-3 
decision, New York’s highest court held that the Lieberman clause was 
enforceable as an arbitration clause which could be enforced “solely on the 
application of neutral principles of contract law.”125 Although the ketubah 
was a document used as part of a religious ceremony, the clause in 
question could be culled from the document and enforced according to 
secular principles without excessive entanglement between religion and 
the state.126 The result of Avitzur is that the parties may be forced (by a 
civil court) to respond to summons of the religious court; the case does not 
address the later question of a wife may later go back to civil court to 
compel her husband’s compliance with an order by a beth din that has 
required the husband to issue a get.127 
Building on the holding of Avitzur (and thus building in part on the 
 
122 “We authorize the Beth Din to impose such terms of compensation as it may see fit for 
failure to respond to its summons or to carry out its decision.”  Quoted in RISKIN, supra 
note 121, at 137. 
123 See id. A possible solution to this constitutional difficulty is for the couple to sign a 
standard civil pre-nuptial agreement in addition to the religious ketubah. See Berger & 
Lipstadt, supra note 110, at 106; Nichols, supra note 4, at 986-87; Esther Rosenfeld, Jewish 
Divorce Law, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 135, 150 (1995).  See also Michelle Greenberg-
Kobring, Civil Enforceability of Religious Prenuptial Agreements, 32 COLUM. J. L. & SOC.
PROBS. 359 (1999) (proposing to use prenuptials to address agunah problems, and 
discussing their validity both at civil and religious law). 
124 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).  But see Victor v. Victor, 
866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1993)(refusing to give civil validity to a similar clause in 
the ketubah, which was viewed as only a religious document).  See also In re Marriage of 
Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 555 N.E. 2d 376 (Ill. 
1990)(construing a standard Orthodox ketubah as an implied contract to give a get). 
125 Id. at 114. 
126 For a fuller discussion of Avitzur, see BREITOWITZ, supra note 15, at 96-106. 
127 See id. at 101. 
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presence of the Lieberman clause in Conservative ketubahs), Jewish rabbis 
and scholars turned to the civil authorities in New York to provide 
assistance in the troublesome realm of recalcitrant husbands and agunot.128 
The efforts culminated in the passage of the first get statute in 1983.  
Legislation had first been introduced in 1981, but was withdrawn because 
of possible constitutional concerns.129 By 1983, substantially similar 
legislation was re-introduced and passed both legislative houses by wide 
margins, and enjoyed the signature of the new Governor, Mario 
Cuomo.130 
3. The introduction of get statutes.
The 1983 law, as amended in 1984,131 is codified as New York 
Domestic Relations Law § 253 (“Removal of Barriers to Remarriage”).132 
Although facially neutral, the statute is clearly drafted so as to apply only 
to Jewish divorces.  The law refrains from using the term “get,” opting 
instead for the legally neutral phrase “barrier to remarriage.”  This phrase 
has a technical meaning in the statute:  “‘barrier to remarriage’ includes, 
without limitation, any religious or conscientious restraint or inhibition, of 
which the party required to make the verified statement is aware, that is 
imposed on a party to a marriage, under the principles held by the 
clergyman or minister who has solemnized the marriage, by reason of the 
other party’s commission or withholding of any voluntary act.”133 The 
gist of the statute, applicable only to persons who were married in a 
religious ceremony, is that a “barrier to remarriage” (a get) must be 
removed, if within the couple’s power to do so, before the state will grant 
a civil divorce.134 
128 Several other attempts at reducing the problem of agunot have been made within 
religious law.  See, e.g., id. at 41-75 (Chap. 2, “The Halachic Response”).  Analysis of these 
responses, including their halachic validity, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
129 See Breitowitz, supra note 89, at 376 n.276.  See also Zornberg, supra note 90, at 729. 
130 The Senate passed the 1983 bill by a margin of 58 to zero.  The Assembly passed the 
bill by a margin of 136 to 7.  See Legislative Bill Jacket, [1983] N.Y. Laws ch. 979 (reporting 
results of the vote on N.Y.S. 6647, N.Y.A. 6423, 206th Sess. (1983)).  Quoted in Zornberg, 
supra note 90, at 729 n. 132.    A number of groups raised constitutional objections (which 
were plainly unheeded) to the final legislation.  See id. at 729-30. 
131 See 1984 N.Y. Laws, ch. 945, § 1.  For explanation of the amendments, see Zornberg, 
supra note 90, at 732 n. 138. 
132 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1999). 
133 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(6) (McKinney 1999). 
134 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(1).  New York, like other states, recognizes religious 
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A more detailed analysis of the statute reveals a number of nuances 
and gaps, however. The statute requires two things of a party initiating an 
action for civil divorce or annulment: (1) an allegation in the complaint 
that the party has taken or will take, to the best of his or her knowledge, 
all steps “solely within his or her power” to remove all barriers to 
remarriage prior to entry of a civil judgment; and (2) the filing of an 
affidavit prior to judgment that the party has indeed removed all barriers 
to remarriage.135 To protect against the filing of false affidavits, the statute 
provides for criminal liability for the intentional filing of a false 
affidavit.136 Further, the statute provides that the clergyman (or rabbi) 
who officiated the wedding ceremony may counter the plaintiff’s affidavit 
with an affidavit stating that barriers to the defendant’s remarriage still 
exist.  If the clergyman so attests, the court is not authorized to enter a 
judgment of civil divorce or annulment.137 Presumably, the clergyman 
will inform the court when the barriers have been removed and the court 
may proceed with the civil action at that time. 
The statute was limited in its scope, however, such that not all 
agunot were covered.  For example, if the woman initiated the civil divorce 
proceeding, the statute did not aid her because it did not force the 
defendant to remove all barriers to remarriage.138 Further, the statute did 
not grant the civil court the power to compel the removal of the barriers to 
remarriage; it only gave the power to refuse to grant a civil divorce.  Thus 
a husband could refuse to issue a get and simply forgo obtaining a civil 
divorce and leave his wife stranded.  Moreover, because the law only 
affects weddings that were “religious” weddings and insists that divorces 
 
marriages by according civil validity to a marriage ceremony performed by a duly 
authorized “clergyman or minister,” which includes rabbis. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 
11(1), (7) (McKinney 1999). 
135 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 253(2) and (3), respectively.  Alternately, the plaintiff may 
allege that the defendant was waived in writing any such requirements.  See id.
136 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(8).  Of course, it is unlikely that New York prosecutors 
would expend time and resources to prosecute plaintiffs who had filed false affidavits in 
domestic divorce cases.  See Scheinkman, supra note 91, at C253:7.  But see Kalika v. Stern, 
911 F.Supp. 594 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (husband had been tried and acquitted of making a false 
statement; there was a good faith dispute as to whether a get was required under the 
circumstances). 
137 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(7). 
138 This is different in the case of a “conversion divorce,” which is a separation decree that 
is changed to a divorce action.  In such a case, both parties must attest to the removal of 
all barriers to remarriage.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253(4). 
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conform to the strictures of the officiating clergyman, it did not account 
for any change in religious belief between the wedding and break-up of 
the marriage.139 
To fix one of these loopholes, in 1993 the New York State 
Legislature enacted additional legislation that attempted to cover 
situations where an aggrieved wife filed for divorce as a plaintiff.  This 
resulted in a more extensive law allowing the civil court to take a party’s 
inability to remarry into account when considering equitable distribution 
of property.140 This 1992 “get statute” applies both to plaintiffs and 
defendants, regardless of whether the parties were married in a religious 
ceremony.  While a similar bill had laid dormant since 1984, it appears 
that impetus for its resurrection and passage lay in a well-popularized 
case involving the daughter of Rabbi Sholom Klass, publisher of The 
Jewish Press.  The case, Schwartz v. Schwartz, involved the wife suing for 
divorce against a recalcitrant husband.  Because the husband did not 
counterclaim (which would have rendered him a plaintiff and 
consequently rendered the 1983 law applicable), the 1983 law did not 
apply and the court could not refuse the civil divorce because of an 
outstanding barrier to remarriage.  However, the judge in the case held 
that the husband’s refusal to issue a get could be taken into account by the 
court in determining the equitable distribution of marital assets.141 The 
1992 amendments accomplish the same results by means of statute rather 
than only common law. 
The result of Schwartz and the 1992 get statutory additions is that a 
court may take a husband’s refusal to issue a get into account when 
distributing the assets of the couple.142 This is critical for an agunah,
whose prospects at financial security through remarriage are seriously 
impaired.  And while the 1992 amendments provide the court with no 
 
139 For further anaylsis, see Breitowitz, supra note 89, at 375-80; Scheinkman, supra note 91. 
140 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 236B(5)(h), (6)(d) (McKinney 1999). 
141 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 153 Misc.2d 789, 583 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1992). 
 The judge found authorization for his decision in the “catch-all” provision of the 
equitable distribution statute, which empowered the court to consider “any other factor 
which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.”  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
236B(5)(d)(13). 
142 Any “barrier to remarriage” (such as a refusal to issue a get) is not to be considered in 
isolation regarding distribution, but is simply one of a set of factors to which the court 
must look.  See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d) (listing 13 factors a court shall consider 
in determining the equitable distribution of property) and § 236B(6)(a) (listing 11 factors a 
court shall consider in determining the amount and duration of maintenance). 
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further power over the decision of recalcitrant husbands not to issue gets, 
the amendments do provide the husband with powerful financial 
incentive to issue a get so that a court will not take his refusal into account 
when distributing marital assets. 
Although the halachic validity of the get statutes, particularly the 
1992 amendments, is much debated in Jewish circles,143 these arguments 
bear little relevance for present purposes.  For regardless of the ultimate 
acceptance and use of the get statutes among Jews, their very existence 
proves that the state of New York has actively sought to provide state 
sanction and assistance to fulfilling the religious requirements of marriage 
and divorce.  That the state may not have achieved its objective in the 
most effective manner for Jews is irrelevant in light of the fact that such a 
strong effort has been made at all. 
 
4. New York’s Laws as Precursors to Covenant Marriage 
Statutes. 
New York’s get statutes reintroduce a radical element into 
American family law:  an acknowledgment that there is more than one 
jurisdictional model and method of marriage and divorce.  If the most 
salient characteristic of covenant marriage laws is their recognition of a 
greater pluralism in family law,144 then New York’s laws were not only 
first in this regard,145 but in fact go farther than covenant marriage laws. 
Functionally, New York’s get statutes affect a greater number of 
persons than the covenant marriage laws.  Although reliable estimates are 
hard to find for either situation, sheer numbers seem to indicate a far 
greater impact in New York than in Louisiana.  In Louisiana, researchers 
estimated that about 2% of new marriages were covenant marriages as of 
2003.146 In New York, there is a substantial Orthodox and Conservative 
Jewish population that may be affected by the get statutes – such at 
estimates are that there are potentially thousands of agunot at any given 
 
143 Compare, e.g., Chaim Dovid Zwiebel, Tragedy Compounded: The Aguna Problem and New 
York’s Controversial New “Get Law,” in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 118, at 141, with 
Marvin E. Jacob, The Agunah Problem and the So-Called New York State Get Law: A Legal and 
Halachic Analysis, in WOMEN IN CHAINS, supra note 118, at 159. 
144 See Nichols, supra note 4, at 988-94. 
145 See Broyde, supra note 43, at 67. 
146 See Nock et al., supra note 4, at 170 (finding that about 2% of Louisiana couples enter 
covenant marriages). 
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time.147 
Structurally, New York’s get statutes outpace covenant marriage 
laws in the level of deference accorded to religious entities and point the 
way to a new era of increased pluralism, if not an outright return to a 
millet system of family law.  A more fulsome millet system in the realm of 
family law would allow religious systems to function as semi-autonomous 
entities with the state acting as the over-arching sovereign that that 
intervenes only when basic minimum guidelines were not met.  While this 
type of more formalized millet system is still a couple of steps removed 
from the current status of family law, New York and Louisiana have taken 
clear steps in this direction. 
 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL MODELS 
In opening the national conversation about the role and boundaries 
of the civil authority with respect to marriage and divorce law, it is also 
prudent to consider contemporary international models for comparison.  
While there is much discussion and debate in the academy about the 
“proper” role of international law for constitutional decision-making,148 it 
is much less controversial to look to other legal systems as illustrative (if 
not normative).  Once we allow ourselves to look at other developed 
nations and their laws respecting marriage and divorce, the notion of 
multiple layers of marriage law and “multi-tiered” systems seems much 
more plausible and workable – for several other countries already 
recognize varying types of marriages and accord different groups at least 
limited jurisdiction over parts of family law. 
In the following section, this Article outlines some – though certainly 
not all – of the variant models of family law jurisdiction in other legal 
 
147 See Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 822 (“Given the large number of Orthodox and 
Conservative Jews that live within [New York], the statutes have a practical importance 
that far exceeds New York’s status as one among fifty states.”).  Estimates are particularly 
difficult, and range from as low as 50 to as many as 150,000.  The low estimate comes 
from a strict reading of the term “agunah” and probably excludes many women who are 
unable to remarry for lack of a get.  The high estimate is probably a typographical error, 
intended initially to read 15,000.  See Breitowitz, supra note 89, at 316 n. 6. 
148 See, e.g., Roger Paul Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International 
Equipoise,, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2005); id., In Search of a Theory for Constitutional 
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005)  See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International 
Constitution, 31 YALE INT’L L.J. 1 (2006). 
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systems.  This comparative approach is not intended to be comprehensive, , 
but it nonetheless casts a wide enough net to observe that there are several 
other exemplars worldwide that already advocate shared jurisdiction in 
marriage and divorce law in more profound ways than the current 
American practice.  A number of these countries have retained systems 
from pre-colonial times and melded those with common law regimes.  But 
others have adopted pluralistic models intentionally as a method of dealing 
with the host of internally diverse cultures. 
 
A.  India 
Marriage and divorce law in India operates primarily through the 
civil apparatus, but purports to apply “religious” law much of the time.  
Indian law has specifically enacted various “religious” laws – Hindu,149 
Muslim,150 Christian,151 and Parsi152 – that are intended to apply to 
adherents of those faiths.  Additionally, there is a residual category in 
Indian for marriages of between members of variant faiths, or for citizens 
who simply choose secular law for themselves.153 Under all of the various 
systems of law, civil courts retain jurisdiction to resolve disputes.154 This 
 
149 The Hindu Code includes the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, the Hindu Succession Act 
of 1956, and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956, and the Hindu Adoption 
and Maintenance Act of 1956.  See Robert D. Baird, Traditional Values, Governmental 
Values, and Religious Conflict in Contemporary India, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 345 (referring 
to these as the “Hindu Code Bill”). 
150 See Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (1937); Dissolution of Muslim 
Marriages Act (1939); and Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986). 
151 See Indian Christian Marriage Act (1872); Indian Divorce Act (1869). 
152 See Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (1936). 
153 See Special Marriage Act (1954). 
Additionally, there is some thought that members of the Jewish faith constitute a 
separate category.  But Jewish personal law is not codified like other religious law is, and 
is Jewish law is primarily governed by contract and customary law.  See Paras Diwan, 
Family Law in THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 639-41 (Joseph Minatur ed., 1978) [hereinafter 
Diwan, LEGAL]; M. A. QURESHI, MARRIAGE AND MATRIMONIAL REMEDIES: A UNIFORM 
CIVIL CODE FOR INDIA 4 (1978). 
154 Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel,
34 ISR. L. REV. 101, 109 (2000).  Family law matters fall under the original jurisdiction of 
the Family Courts, which were established in 1984.  See Family Courts Act, 1984 
explanation (establishing “Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and 
secure speedy settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for 
matters connected therewith.”).  Appeals from Family Courts are taken to the High court 
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leads, at times, to some difficulties about how to interpret changes within 
various systems of law and whether such changes should (and must) 
come from the civil court systems itself or from within the various 
religious communities to whom the law applies.155 Further, because 
customary religious law is permitted to supplement (though not to 
contradict) statutory law,156 divorce may occur at times without judicial 
intervention at all.  This is especially true of Muslim divorces,157 but also 
holds for Hindu divorces as well.158 
Religious affiliation is the prime determinant in choosing the 
governing law for marriage and divorce issues.  But, as discussed below, 
religious belief is not the prime governing factor for choice of personal law. 
 Rather, it is membership in a particular “religious” community by birth – 
or entrance into that community by conversion – that is decisive.159 So 
long as the individual does not denounce the religion outright and take up 
another, generally that person will be ruled by the personal law of the 
community to which she belongs.160 And because the personal laws are 
national in scope in India (rather than varying state by state, as is the case 
in the United States),161 the choice of law determination is the prime 
jurisdictional decision. 
The practice of having multiple contiguous systems of personal 
laws originates with British colonial rule.  In the late 18th century the 
British authorities established a general territorial law, with a common 
law type system of courts, but retained “enclaves of personal law.”162 For 
example, the Bengal regulation of 1772 provided that with regard to 
 
of each state.  Family Courts Act § 19(1). 
155 The Shah Bano case, discussed infra notes 225-229 and accompanying text, is a good 
example of this. 
156 See PARAS DIWAN, FAMILY LAW: LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN INDIA 4 (1983) 
[hereinafter DIWAN, FAMILY LAW]; Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 634-35. 
157 DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 159.  The only codified portion of Muslim 
divorce law in India concerns petitions of divorce brought by the wife. 
158 DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 163-65 (Some of the customary grounds for 
divorce include renunciation, abandonment, repudiation, immorality, unchastity, 
adultery, conversion, and mutual consent.). 
159 See DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156 at 3, 164. 
160 Id. 
161 Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 634. 
162 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 106.  See also Louise Harmon & Eileen 
Kaufman, Dazzling the World:  A Study of India’s Constitutional Amendment Mandating 
Reservation for Women on Rural Panchayats, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 32, 43 (2004). 
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“inheritance, marriage, caste, and other religious usages, or institutions” 
the courts should apply “the laws of the Koran with respect to the 
Mahometans, and those of the Shaster with respect to the Hindus.”163 
This policy of retaining separate systems of personal law continued with 
few exceptions up until Indian independence.  The shaping of the bodies 
of law was largely left to the religious groups themselves, with a few 
exceptions to regulate practices outside the norm by British standards 
(such as against child marriage, against immolation of widows (Sati), 
permitting remarriage of widows, and the like).164 But these bodies of 
“religious” law were not administered by religious authorities and courts, 
but rather by the civil authorities:  Common law judges ruled on matters 
of Hindu and Muslim law, although the courts had the assistance of native 
law officers to advise on the nuances of the religious laws.165 Beginning in 
1860, though, the religious advisors were abolished and the judges took 
exclusive control in applying the personal law.  This in turn began to 
render the “religious” personal laws less distinctly religious and instead 
more reflective of the views and interpretations of the common law judges 
themselves – such that one commentator has described the development 
of new bodies of “Anglo-Hindu” and “Anglo-Muslim” law.166 
Various reforms were undertaken within the 20th century to 
conform Indian personal law to more modern standards and 
understandings of human rights.  Many of these reforms originated from 
within the various religious communities themselves – and were thereafter 
reified in law by the governing legislative authority.167 A prime example 
of this modernization is the reform and unification of Hindu law in the 
mid-1950’s, leading to adoption of what is now known as the Hindu 
 
163 Bengal Regulation of 1772.  Galanter and Krishnan note that the language was 
amended by 1793 to read “Mohamadan Laws” and “Hindu Laws.”  Galanter & Krishnan, 
supra note 154, at 106 n.23 (citing to Regulation IV of 1793, sec. 15.). 
164 Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 162, at 44.  Laws permitting widow remarriage and 
civil marriage were available as an alternative to Hindu law, but few chose to opt out of 
the personal law system.  Id.; see also Marc Galanter, Remarks on Family Law and Social 
Change in India in CHINESE FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORICAL AND 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 492, 494 (David C. Buxbaum ed., 1978). 
165 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 106. 
166 Id. at 106-07.  See also Martha C. Nussbaum, International Human Rights Law in Practice: 
India:  Implementing Sex Equality Through Law, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 35, 40-47 (2001) (discussing 
the possibility for reform within bodies of religious law in India). 
167 See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 41-47 (discussing various reforms within Hindu, 
Christian, and Muslim personal law). 
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Code.168 The changes included (among others) the abolition of polygamy, 
the availability of divorce, and a more equitable distribution of property 
rights between genders.169 While this provided unification of Hindu law, 
it also rendered the law applicable to “Hindus” more of a modern civil 
law rather than traditional religious Hindu law.170 
Just prior to this reform of Hindu Law, India’s new constitution 
had come into force in 1950.  Therein, there was (and still is) a hortatory 
provision directing the state to “endeavor to secure for the citizens a 
uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.”171 This provision 
“appears to envision the dissolution of the personal law system in favor of 
a Uniform Civil [personal] Code,”172 but there has been very little 
movement to date in this direction.  In part, this lack of movement toward 
a unified personal law system lies in the fact that a uniform code would 
necessarily mean that abolition of the various personal laws set forth 
below; this would especially anger the minority Muslim community 
because it would alter the unique characteristics of that religious group.173 
The wisdom of unification is much debated both within academic 
literature174 as well as within politics.175 However, there is also strong 
 
168 See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH, ch 3 (2000); see also Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 107-08; Galanter, 
supra note 164, passim.
169 See Baird, supra note 149, at 345. 
170 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 149, at 345 (“[The Hindu Code] bills provide uniformity in 
family matters to legally classed ‘Hindus’; they also modernaze the Hindu Code, not on 
the basis of sacred texts, but on the basis of rationality, modernity, social needs, and even 
world opinion.”). 
171 India Const. art. 44.  “Uniform civil code for the citizens.—The State shall endeavour 
to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” 
172 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 107. 
173 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 164, at 494; Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 43-47; Baird, 
supra note 149, at 344-46. 
174 See, e.g.,  Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 46 (“The [current] system of personal laws has 
many severe problems.”); Ruma Pal, Religious Minorities and the Law in RELIGION AND 
PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA 24, 32-33 (Gerald James Larson ed., 2001), (“While laws 
may be derived from religion, they do not form part of it, and the need for a uniform civil 
code cannot be overstated.”); Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice:  
The Impact of Protecting Multiculturalism on Women’s Rights in India, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
201, 209 (2005) (“India’s framework of separate personal laws for various religious 
communities is … a good example of how a multiculturalist approach to law and 
governance in India has resulted in undermining women’s rights.”). 
175 For example, the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has used calls for a 
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opposition to a uniform code because the minority religious groups fear 
the new law would only represent the traditions of the majority Hindu 
population.176 In any event, the current legal structure in place continues 
to hold five distinct categories of personal law:  Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Parsi, and a residual category of secular law.177 
Hinduism.  The personal law applicable to Hindus is easily the 
most widely-applied, for over 82% of India’s population of 1.08 billion 
self-identifies as Hindu (if Sikhs are included).178 The Hindu Code applies 
to all such persons, as it is the governing law for any person who is 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh by religion.179 Hindu law also explicitly 
applies to “any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act 
extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion.”180 By 
default, then, Hindu law applies to all Indians who are not Muslim, 
Christian, Parsi, or Jew – demonstrating that the term “Hindu” has largely 
lost its religious connotation for purposes of modern Indian Hindu 
 
UCC (or for a reform of Muslim personal law) as part of its platform in recent national 
elections, in order to make the laws fit the “constitutional guarantees of equality and 
dignity of women.” See The Times of India, “BJP favours reforms in Muslim laws” June 
29, 2005, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1154979.cms; Galanter & 
Krishnan, supra note 154, at 110-11.   But there is a strong resistance to the current 
unification of personal law, for fear that the resulting legislative enactment would simply 
be .  See, e.g., id.; Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 46 (“In this day of growing Hindu 
fundamentalism, Uniform Code really does mean Hindu Code, and the resistance of the 
Muslim minority to losing its legal system is comprehensible.”). 
176 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154,  at 110. 
177 As noted below, “Hindu law” technically applies as a default (or residual) category for 
all those who do not fall under a different personal law and do not choose to subject 
themselves to the Special Marriage Act.  Further, discussion of the applicable personal 
laws below is necessarily abbreviated and typically omits discussion of separation, 
maintenance, child custody, and others, in order to focus more directly on laws of 
marriage and absolute divorce. 
178 All population numbers and religious percentages are from the CIA World Factbook, 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html.  
179 Hindu Marriage Act § 2 (1955).  The following are considered Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, 
or Sikh by religion:  (a) any child both of whose parents are Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or 
Sikh by religion, (b) any child who has one Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh parent and 
was brought up as a member of that community, or (c) any person who is a convert or 
reconvert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh religion.  Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
180 Hindu Marriage Act § 2(c) (1955). See also DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 5; 
JASPAL SINGH, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN INDIA 3-6 (1983); Diwan, LEGAL, supra 
note 153, at 636-37. 
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personal law.181 
The Hindu Marriage Act (1955) governs marriages.  Polygamy is 
expressly disallowed, as it is rendered a penal offense punishable by jail 
time.182 Marriage between a Hindu and a non-Hindu is not permitted 
under this Act, but this prohibition is not as harsh as first appears for two 
reasons.  First, since “Hindu” under the Act includes “any person who is 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh by religion,”183 then any of those two 
individuals could marry under the Hindu Marriage Act.  Second, a Hindu 
and non-Hindu could marry under the secular Special Marriage Act.184 
Also, the Hindu Marriage Act attempted to abolish child marriage by 
establishing the legal age marriage at 21 years for males and 18 years for 
females.185 Even so, child marriage is considered neither void nor 
voidable (that is, the resulting marriage is still valid), but penalties such as 
jail time or a fine may attach to persons who marry underage.186 Couples 
seeking to enter a valid Hindu marriage may do so by either: (1) choosing 
to perform the Shastric rite and ceremonies recognized by Hindu law; or 
(2) performing customary formalities which prevail in the caste, 
community, or tribe to which one (or both) parties belong.187 Once validly 
entered through one of those two methods, there is no national 
requirement for the Hindu marriage to be registered with the civil 
authorities.188 
181 Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 636-37.  There is also the issue of the Special Marriage 
Act, whereby individuals can proceed under secular civil law in some circumstances.  See 
infra notes 258-273 and accompanying text. 
182 Hindu Marriage Act § 5(i) (1955).  See also DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 56 
(stating that prior to 1955 Hindu men were permitted to have an unlimited number of 
wives); QURESHI, supra note 153, at 50. 
183 Hindu Marriage Act § 2 (1955). 
184 See infra notes 258-259. 
185 Hindu Marriage Act § 5(iii).  The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 first introduced 
age provisions, setting minimum ages at 18 for males and 15 for females.  By Amendment 
in 1978, the ages were set to their present state.  See  DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, 
at 56-57.  
186 DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 57.  See also PARAS DIWAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE 126-27 (4th ed. 2002). 
187 Hindu Marriage Act § 7 (1955).  See also DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 64 
(noting that the customary ceremonies be both ancient and obligatory, and need only 
prevail on the side of one of the adherents (and not necessarily both)); B. P. BERI, LAW OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN INDIA, 2D ED. 23 (1989). 
188 Hindu Marriage Act § 8 (1955).  See also DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 66 
(stating that even where state governments have made registration compulsory, failure to 
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Prior to the 1955, Hindu law rendered marriage indissoluble, 
leaving no possibility for divorce.189 The Act introduced the seminal 
change of the availability of judicial divorce190 – which, when coupled 
with the alteration of male-only inheritance rules, the changing of the age 
of capacity for marriage, and, especially, the abolition of polygamy, left 
Indian Hindu personal law in a quite different form from its previous 
condition as truly religious law.191 In its present form (as amended in 
1976), the Act provides for judicial decree of divorce based on either fault 
grounds or mutual consent.192 Under the fault theory of divorce, either 
husband or wife may sue for divorce based on adultery, cruelty, desertion 
for a period of not less then two years, conversion away from Hinduism, 
unsound mind/mental disorder, leprosy, venereal disease in a 
communicable form, renunciation of the world, or not heard of as alive for 
seven years.193 Either party may also seek a decree of divorce on the 
ground that there has been no resumption of cohabitation for one year or 
more after a decree for judicial separation or no restitution of conjugal 
rights for one year or more after a decree for restitution of conjugal 
rights.194 There are also some limited special grounds upon which only a 
wife may seek divorce.195 
register does not effect the validity of the marriage but only subjects the person to a 
nominal fine.) 
189 See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 108; Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 43. 
190 Hindu Marriage Act, § 13 (1955).  Prior to passage of the Hindu Marriage Act there 
were certain areas of India that had customary rules regarding divorce within the Hindu 
religion, but the Hindu Marriage Act was the first national legislation regulating and 
permitting divorce for Hindus in India generally.  See Sampak P. Garg, Law and Religion: 
The Divorce Systems of India, 6 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 16 & n. 173 (1998). 
191 See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 108 (“Very few rules remained with a 
specifically religious foundation.”); Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 43. 
192 Hindu Marriage Act §§ 13, 13B (1955) (amended 1976); see also Garg, supra note 190, at 
16. 
193 Hindu Marriage Act § 13(1)(i)-(vii) (1955); see also Garg, supra note 190, at 16-18. 
194 Hindu Marriage Act § 13(1A)(i)-(ii) (1955). 
195 These include: include: if a previous spouse of the husband was alive at the time of a 
marriage conducted before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act; the husband 
has been guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality, since the solemnization of the marriage; 
there has been no cohabitation for one year after an order of maintenance is passed under 
the Hindu Maintenance and Adoptions Act or the Criminal Procedure Code; or, if the 
marriage was solemnized before the wife attained the age of fifteen years, and she 
repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years.  Hindu Marriage Act 
§ 13(2)(1)-(iv) (1955). 
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The couple may also agree to divorce and seek a judicial decree 
based upon mutual consent.  They must allege that “they have been living 
separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able 
to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage 
should be dissolved.”196 In such cases, a court must act between six and 
eighteen months after the petition is filed, presumably to give the couple a 
chance to reconcile and withdraw the petition.197 
Finally, the Hindu Marriage Act provides an additional time 
restriction on judicial divorce – namely that couples may not seek a 
judicial decree of divorce within one year of marriage.198 The law 
provides exception by permitting a petition within the first year of 
marriage if the case is “one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of 
exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.”199 
Islam.  Muslims make up the largest minority group in India, about 
13.4%.200 In personal law matters, there are three main addressing specific 
areas of law:  the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (1937), 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (1939), and the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986).  By their terms, these laws are 
the “rule of decision” in all cases “where the parties are Muslim.”201 
Unlike Hindu law in India, much of Islamic law (Shari’ah)202 in India 
 
196 Hindu Marriage Act § 13B(1) (1955); see also Garg, supra note 190, at 18. 
197 Hindu Marriage Act § 13B(2) (1955); see also Garg, supra note 190, at 18. 
198 Hindu Marriage Act § 14(1) (1955). 
199 Hindu Marriage Act § 14(1) (1955). 
200 CIA World Factbook. 
201 Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act § 2 (1937).  The full text of the 
applicability provision reads as follows:  
Notwithstanding any customs or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save 
questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special 
property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under 
contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of 
marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, 
dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than 
charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religion endowments) the 
rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat). 
Id. 
202 The phrase “Islamic law” has a host of meanings, which are beyond the scope of the 
discussion herein.  For a more detailed discussion of Islamic law respecting marriage and 
divorce matters generally (and not simply confined to the Indian context), see DAWOUD 
40 LAW REVIEW [Vol. xx 
 
remains uncodified, and instead proceeds from case law and precedent.203 
The definition of who is a Muslim in India for purposes of the personal 
law derives from such case law:  Muslims are those who are born to 
Muslim parents, or those who convert to Islam (either by profession of 
faith or by a formal conversion ceremony).204 
Marriage under the Muslim law is “a contract which has for its 
object procreation and legalizing of children.”205 The marriage is 
generally accomplished by a proposal and acceptance made at the same 
meeting.206 Polygamy is still permitted under the Muslim personal law in 
India, with the husband allowed to take up to four wives at a time.207 
(This presents a potential problem at times within India, for no other 
religious law allows polygamy any longer and men may be attracted to 
Islam simply to be able to practice polygamy.)208 However, Islam itself 
 
SUDQI EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE 
ARAB WORLD (1996); DAWOUD S. EL ALAMI, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW IN 
THE SHARI’AH AND PERSONAL STATUS LAWS OF EGYPT AND MOROCCO (1992); JAMAL J. 
NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER MODERN ISLAMIC 
LEGISLATION (1990); Nichols, supra note 4, at 982-83. 
203 See Garg, supra note 190, at 3. 
204 See DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 7-9, and cases cited therein.  Under Indian 
law, if a child is born to one Hindu parent and one Muslim parent, the personal law of 
that child will be determined according to which faith the child is “brought up.”  Id. at 8. 
205 BERI, supra note 187, at 41 citation omitted). 
206 See id. at 42.  See also Nichols, supra note 4, at 982 and sources cited therein. 
207 See Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 44 (stating that polygamy is a legal option for Muslim 
men, but is exercised in only about five percent of marriages).  See also QURESHI, supra 
note 153, at 51-55. 
208 Indian courts have tended to hold that if one spouse changes religion, then the 
marriage is still ruled by the personal law under which the couple was originally 
married.  “[N]o spouse can, on converting to another religion, impose his new religion 
and new law on the other spouse.”  DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 24-25.  More 
directly on point, In the Supreme Court case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, decided May 
5, 2000, the court considered the question of whether a second marriage entered into by a 
convert to Islam would be valid where the individual merely converted with a view to 
enter into a second marriage.  Justice S Sagir Ahmad wrote in paragraph 33, “So long as 
that [Hindu] marriage subsists, another marriage cannot be performed, not even under 
any other personal law, and on such marriage being performed, the person would be 
liable to be prosecuted for the offence under § 494 IPC.”  And, in paragraph 61, Justice R. 
P. Sethi wrote, “The second marriage of a Hindu husband after embracing Islam being 
violative of justice, equity and good conscience would be void on that ground also and 
attract the provisions of § 494 IPC.”  Lily Thomas V. Union of India & ORS and other 
Appeals, 2 LRI 623 (Sup. Ct. of India, May 5, 2000). 
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limits the practice of polygamy so that a man may only marry more than 
once if he can treat all his wives with equity, otherwise, he may only take 
one wife.209 Muslim men are allowed to marry non-Muslim women, but 
Muslim women may only marry within their faith under Muslim personal 
law.210 
Muslim divorce in India can be divided into three categories:  
judicial divorce, divorce by mutual agreement, and non-judicial unilateral 
divorce.211 Muslim marriages may also be dissolved as the result of 
apostasy from Islam.  If the husband converts away from Islam, the 
marriage is automatically dissolved, but if the wife converts away, she 
must still sue for divorce from her husband because of the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act.212 
Judicial divorce, governed by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act, requires recourse to the civil courts and is available only to females.213 
Before passage of the Act, a Muslim wife in India had virtually no right of 
divorce.214 With the change in the law, there are now several enumerated 
grounds upon Muslim women may seek a judicial decree of divorce, 
including:  unknown whereabouts of the husband; the husband’s failure 
to provide maintenance; imprisonment of the husband; the husband’s 
failure to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital obligations; 
impotence, insanity, or severe disease of the husband; underage marriage 
 
209 See Qur’an 4:3; see also Melanie D. Reed, Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition:  The 
Application of Shari’a in a Modern World, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 485, 520 (2004). 
210 See NASIR, supra note 202, at 27-28. 
211 See Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 655; Garg, supra note 190, at 7.  Further, because 
marriage is a contract under Islamic law, only valid marriage contracts may end in 
divorce.  If the marriage contract was not valid for one of a number of reasons, the parties 
must separate either on their own or by court order (effectively annulling the marriage).  
See NASIR, supra note 202, at 70, 95-96; Nichols, supra note 4, at 982 (listing possible 
reasons a marriage might be invalidly formed). 
212 See Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act § 4 (1939) (“The renunciation of Islam by a 
married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself 
operate to dissolve her marriage….”); Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 657; NASIR (3D
ED.), supra note 202, at 134. 
213 See Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act. 
214 See Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 43; JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY 
LAW 76 (2nd ed. 2001) (“The real purpose of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, like 
that of comparable Egyptian legislation, was to introduce reforms that would improve 
that status of women and grant them some judicial relief by establishing additional 
grounds for divorce, most of which were not recognized by Hanafi law, the official law 
followed by the courts of the subcontinent…”).  
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cruelty;215 or other grounds recognized under Muslim law.216 One notable 
outcome is that by civilly instituting these methods of divorce for women, 
the government in India has somewhat circumvented the choice of the 
religious adherents regarding what “Islamic law” means for them.217 
Although not codified, parties in a Muslim marriage may also 
divorce by mutual consent.218 “Roughly speaking, [divorce by mutual 
agreement] is known as khul’ where the aversion is on the side of the wife, 
and mubara’a where this is mutual.”219 This kind of mutual agreement 
rises to legal status through a form of offer and acceptance, usually 
through the wife paying the husband the amount of her dower.220 In 
India, the court need not be involved in this type of divorce if amicably 
undertaken by the parties. 
The third kind of divorce is non-judicial, unilateral divorce – which 
is a right reserved for husbands under Muslim personal law.  This 
repudiation of the marriage by the husband is called talaq 
(“repudiation”).221 Talaq comes in several forms, but all that is required is 
that the husband be of majority age and sane, and that he speak words 
that indicate an intention to divorce.222 There are approved forms of talaq 
which give the husband a period of time during which he may withdraw 
his repudiation, and the customary form which requires only that the 
husband say, “I divorce thee,” three times and is immediately effective – 
without involvement of any civil authority.223 The husband may 
generally delegate his unilateral right of divorce to any other third party, 
 
215 Cruelty is defined in some detail in the law, including lack of equitable treatment of 
multiple wives, physical mistreatment, immorality of the husband, interference in the 
wife’s property rights, or disruption in the wife’s religious observance.  Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriages Act § 2(viii)(a)-(f) (1939). 
216 Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act § 2(i)-(ix) (1939). 
217 See Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 43 (noting that the state effectively instituted the 
Maliki school of interpretation rather than the Hanafi school).  Prior to the passage of the 
1939 law, many Muslim women were converting to other religions in order to obtain the 
right to divorce.  Id. Thus, more leeway for women to divorce was introduced in the 
Muslim law itself, and Muslim women were simultaneously disallowed to divorce solely 
for reasons of their own conversion. 
218 See DIWAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (4TH ED.), supra note 186, at 587-92. 
219 EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 202, at 27.  See also NASIR, supra note 202, at 78-81. 
220 See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 202, at 27-28; ESPOSITO, supra note 214, at 32. 
221 See Garg, supra note 190, at 7; Nichols, supra note 4, at 983-84.. 
222 See ESPOSITO, supra note 214, at 29; Garg, supra note 190, at 8-9. 
223 See ESPOSITO, supra note 214, at 30-31; Garg, supra note 190, at 8. 
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including the wife.224 
Finally, India has addressed one other aspect of Muslim marriage 
in the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.  This 
law was passed by the legislature in response to the famous Shah Bano 
case.225 The case arose after sixty-four-year-old Shah Bano was divorced 
by her husband of forty-three years (who happened to be a prosperous 
lawyer) through his invocation of triple talaq.226 Under traditional Islamic 
law, women divorced this way were not entitled to maintenance, but only 
the return of the dowry from the outset of marriage.  This had led to 
regular and severe underfunding of Muslim women, and so women had 
pursued additional maintenance under section 25 of the Indian Criminal 
Code, which requires men “of adequate means” to provide for their ex-
wives.227 Shah Bano sued her ex-husband for maintenance – as many 
other women had successfully done before her – and she won an award of 
maintenance in the lower court.  On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed 
and awarded her even more maintenance, in an opinion that criticized 
Islamic practices.  Thus, the justices not only applied the Criminal Code 
over the personal laws, but stated that the finding was consistent with the 
Quran.228 This opinion set off a storm of protest within the Muslim 
community – because they took it as a sign that the Muslim Personal Law 
was being weakened by judicial re-interpretation.  Muslim leaders 
therefore lobbied the legislature and secured passage of the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986.229 The Act 
effectuates a legislative reversal of Shah Bano, by depriving all Muslim 
women (but no others) of the right to seek maintenance after Muslim 
divorce under the criminal code, and putting the responsibility for 
maintenance on the wife’s family. 
 
224 See EL ALAMI & HINCHCLIFFE, supra note 202, at 25. 
225 Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Others, 72 AIR SC 945 (1985). 
226 Commentary abounds regarding the Shaw Bano case and its aftermath.  See, e.g., 
GERALD JAMES LARSON, INDIA’S AGONY OVER RELIGION 256-61 (1995); SHACHAR, supra 
note 14, at 81-83; ESPOSITO, supra note 214, at 114-16; Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 44-45; 
Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 111-14; Pal, supra note 174, at 31-32; Harmon & 
Kaufman, supra note 162, at 49-50. 
227 See Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 44. 
228 Shah Bano, 72 AIR SC 945, 946-47 (stating, among other things, that the “fatal point in 
Islam is the degradation of woman”). 
229 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act (1986). 
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Christianity.  Christians constitute a smaller minority (2.3%) of the 
Indian population.230 The laws governing Christian marriage and divorce 
are relatively antiquated, even when compared to the other religions, as 
the laws have not been substantially updated since the late 19th century. 
The Indian Christian Marriage Act (1872) – which expressly applies 
to “persons professing the Christian religion”231 – provides for 
monogamous marriages between two Christians (or between one 
Christian and one non-Christian).232 The engaged couple must be the age 
of capacity: 21 for males and 18 for females.233 Marriage is treated 
primarily as a contract between the parties, with attendant formalities 
required.234 Once the officiant has solemnized the marriage, it must be 
registered with the civil authorities to be binding.235 
The law governing Indian Christian divorce has given 
commentators more pause than the marriage law.236 But it has just 
recently been amended (2001) to implement a number of modernizing 
changes.237 Prior to amendment, the law governing Christian marriage 
(the Indian Divorce Act (1869)) permitted divorce only in cases of “hard 
fault.”238 Men were allowed to institute divorce proceedings only for 
adultery, and women were allowed institute proceedings only for 
adultery coupled with some other flaw.239 Under the newer amendments, 
 
230 CIA World Factbook.  
231 Indian Christian Marriage Act, preamble (1872). 
232 Indian Christian Marriage Act §§ 4, 60(2) (1872); WILLIAM E. PINTO, LAW OF MARRIAGE 
AND MATRIMONIAL RELIEFS FOR CHRISTIANS IN INDIA 33-35 (1991); DIWAN, FAMILY LAW,
supra note 156, at 35. 
233 Indian Christian Marriage Act § 60(1) (1872). 
234 See Indian Christian Marriage Act § 4 (1872); PINTO, supra note 232, at 34-35. But the 
sacramental aspect of Christian marital teaching is also recognized, for the Act also 
permits the clergy to administer the ceremony under solemn procedures, and then 
renders the marriage indissoluble except in cases of hard fault.  See id. 
235 See, e.g., Indian Christian Marriage Act §§ 27ff. (1872); Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 
646. 
236 See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 166, at 41-43. 
237 See The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 (reprinted in DIWAN, LAW OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 4TH ED. at 1116). 
238 See Indian Divorce Act (1869). 
239 See Indian Divorce Act § 10 (1869) (allowing for a woman to petition for divorce 
alleging adultery coupled with: incest; bigamy; marriage with another woman; rape, 
sodomy, or bestiality; cruelty; or desertion).  See also  PINTO, supra note 232, at 133.  
Further, women could also petition for divorce if the “husband has exchanged his 
profession of Christianity for the profession of some other  religion, and gone through a 
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Christian marriages may be dissolved either unilaterally (for fault) or by 
mutual consent.  Either the man or woman is now permitted to petition 
the court for dissolution on grounds of adultery, conversion by the spouse 
to another religion, insanity, desertion, cruelty, or other reasons.240 
Additionally, women may petition for divorce if the husband has been 
guilty of rape, sodomy, or bestiality.241 Or, importantly, the parties may 
jointly petition the court for a divorce if they have been living separate 
and apart for at least two years and “have mutually agreed that the 
marriage should be dissolved.”242 Rather awkwardly, the revised Indian 
Divorce Act requires the parties to wait at least six months (but not longer 
than 18 months) after the submission of the mutual request for dissolution 
and then petition the court again; at that point, the court may pass a decree 
dissolving the marriage.243 
Parsi (Zoroastrianism).  Parsis (also known as members of the 
Zoroastrian faith) initially migrated to India in the 8th century because of 
persecution in their native Persia.244 They were initially governed by 
custom, which incorporated much of the local Hindu law and customs.245 
In 1865 the first Parsi Marriage and Divorce Bill was passed, and it was 
subsequently modernized and replaced by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
Act of 1936.246 (Even so, custom continues to govern some minor 
matrimonial matters, including form of the ceremony.)247 Modern Indian 
Parsi personal law applies to all who are “Parsi Zoroastrians”248 – which 
typically include individuals who descended from Zoroastrian parents 
and profess the Zoroastrian faith.249 
form of marriage with another woman.”  Indian Divorce Act § 10 (1869) 
240 The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act § 10(1)(i)-(x)(2001). 
241 The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act § 10(2) (2001). 
242 The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act § 10A(1) (2001). 
243 The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act § 10A(2) (2001).  See also Nussbaum, supra note 
166, at 42-43. 
244 See BERI, supra note 187, at 48. 
245 Id. at 48-49. 
246 Id. at 49. 
247 See DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 5. 
248 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 2 (7) (1936). 
249 See DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 9.  Diwan notes that conversion into the 
Parsi faith is “against the usage and customs of the Parsis of India.”  Id. 
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Under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Parsi marriage is 
required to be only between two Parsis, and must be monogamous.250 
Like other faiths in India, the minimum age of marriage is twenty-one 
years for males and eighteen years for females.251 Marriage is a contract, 
but it must be solemnized by a priest with the ashirvad ceremony in the 
presence of two additional witnesses.252 The officiating priest must then 
submit a registration form to the civil authorities for the marriage to be 
considered valid.253 
Fault-based divorce for Parsi marriages is statutorily permitted 
equally to the husband and wife.254 There are a host of permissible 
grounds on which a disaffected spouse may allege fault and thereby 
petition for divorce, including adultery, insanity, desertion, conversion by 
the other spouse to another religion, pre-existing pregnancy, and others.255 
If the fault-based ground for divorce is adultery, then the Act specifies 
that “the person with whom the adultery is alleged to have been 
committed” shall be made a co-defendant (along with the allegedly 
adulterous spouse).  If the husband is the plaintiff in such cases, the court 
has the option of ordering this third party to pay all or any part of the 
costs of the divorce proceeding.256 
The Act also allows for divorce based on mutual consent of both 
parties.  In such cases, the parties must allege that they have lived 
separately for at least one year, that they are not able to live together, and 
that they mutually agree that the marriage should be dissolved.257 
Civil Marriage and Divorce. Beginning in 1872, India established a 
procedure for non-religious, civil marriage for anyone who declared they 
were not a professing Christian, Jew, Parsi, Hindu, Muslim, or Jain.  In 
1954, the Special Marriage Act was modernized to eliminate the need for 
any such foreswearing, and parties of any religion may be married under 
 
250 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 4 (1936). 
251 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act  § 3(c) (1936). 
252 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act  § 3(b) (1936); DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 
34. 
253 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 6 (1936). 
254 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 32 (1936) (“Any married person may sue for 
divorce…”). 
255 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act §32(a)-(j) (1936); 
256 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 33 (1936). 
257 Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act § 32B(1) (1936). 
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the Act.258 This is especially advantageous for two Indians of different 
faiths who wish to marry, in the event that neither of the applicable 
personal laws would allow marriage otherwise (e.g., a Hindu and a 
Muslim).259 Because civil marriage under the Act is effectively a civil 
contract,260 the parties must choose to so enter the marriage and must 
attend to minimum formalities – including publication of banns,261 some 
form of solemnization before three witnesses and a Marriage Officer,262 
recitation of a binding declaration in the presence of those parties,263 and 
registration.264 
One notable feature of the civil marriage statute is that it provides a 
method for already-married parties to change the applicable law to that of 
the Special Marriage Act.265 To do so, parties must jointly petition the 
relevant civil Marriage Officer, who will post a notice (akin to banns) for 
30 days.266 If there are no objections – and the if the parties otherwise 
would have met the requirements for civil marriage – then the Marriage 
Officer registers the marriage and the parties thereafter operate under the 
structure and strictures of the Special Marriage Act rather than the 
previously applicable “religious” personal law.267 
Parties married under the Special Marriage Act may seek a judicial 
divorce either unilaterally or by mutual consent.  Unilaterally, either 
husband or wife may petition for divorce on a number of fault grounds, 
including adultery, desertion for two or more years, long term 
imprisonment of the spouse, cruelty, insanity, or other reasons.268 By later 
 
258 Special Marriage Act (1954); QURESHI, supra note 153, at 4.  There are some minimum 
requirements for parties to be eligible to enter a civil marriage, including that the parties 
must be of sound mind, capable of giving consent, be of minimum age (21 for males and 
18 for females), not be within degrees of prohibited relation, and not have another living 
spouse.  Special Marriage Act § 4(a)-(d) (1954); BERI, supra note 187, at 60-62.  A lack of 
valid consent or bigamous marriage would render a civil marriage null and void.  Special 
Marriage Act § 24 (1954) 
259 Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 156, at 644; QURESHI, supra note 153, at 4. 
260 DIWAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 156, at 35. 
261 Special Marriage Act §§ 5-10, 14 (1954). 
262 Special Marriage Act § 11 (1954). 
263 Special Marriage Act § 12 (1954).  The parties must declare the following: “I, (A), take 
thee (B), to be my lawful wedded wife/husband.”  Id. 
264 Special Marriage Act § 13 (1954). 
265 Special Marriage Act §§ 15-18 (1954). 
266 Special Marriage Act § 16 (1954). 
267 Special Marriage Act §§ 17-18 (1954). 
268 Special Marriage Act § 27(1)(a)-(h) (1954). 
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amendment, there are now a few additional grounds available only to a 
complaining wife – such as rape,  sodomy, or bestiality, or the non- 
cohabitation within one year after the wife has been awarded 
maintenance.269 Further, either husband or wife may individually petition 
for divorce under the theory that the marriage has broken down if there 
has been no resumption of cohabitation or restitution of conjugal rights 
one year after an order for the resumption or restitution.270 
There is also provision under the Special Marriage Act for couples 
jointly to petition the court for divorce by mutual consent.271 The 
attestations and applicable waiting period before the court will act upon 
the petition mirror those in the amended Indian Divorce Act (applicable to 
Christian Marriages).272 There is also a requirement, akin to that in Hindu 
Marriage Law, that a court will not grant a divorce before the completion 
of one year of marriage so that the couple may have a chance to 
reconcile.273 
B. Kenya 
 
Another example that may be adduced – albeit in a more cursory 
fashion – is Kenya, another former British colony.  Kenya’s former colonial 
status is significant (as it was for India) because it has led to the admixture 
of pre-existing customary laws with Western-style statutes and common 
law introduced by the British.  The combination of these two factors, 
coupled with the religious diversity of the nation of Kenya both now and in 
colonial times, has produced a multi-tiered system of personal law. 
There are four basic systems of statutory marriage in Kenya:  Civil 
Marriage, 274 African Christian Marriage,275 Muslim Law,276 and Hindu 
Law.277 Further, customary marriages are expressly recognized, although 
 
269 Special Marriage Act § 27(1A)(i)-(ii) (1976). 
270 Special Marriage Act § 27(2)(i)-(ii) (1970); Diwan, LEGAL, supra note 153, at 655. 
271 Special Marriage Act § 28 (1954). 
272 Cf. supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
273 Special Marriage Act § 29. 
274 Marriage Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 150 (1960). 
275 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 151 (1962). 
276 Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 156 
(1962). 
277 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, Laws of Kenya CAP 157 (1962). 
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they are not codified.278 
Jurisdiction over entrance into marriage varies according to the form 
of marriage entered.  By way of example, Christian marriage may be 
celebrated either by a licensed minister or by a civil official – either of whom 
must then register the marriage with the proper state registry.  But Muslim 
marriages fall exclusively to the province of general (uncodified) Islamic 
law, although Islamic marriages must be registered with the proper 
authority.  And there is no particular form of marriage nor registration 
requirement at all for customary marriages. 
Jurisdiction over divorce is not much cleaner.  For those forms of 
marriage that are subject to the Matrimonial Causes Act (Civil, African 
Christian, and Hindu), the civil “High Court” is authorized to address these 
matters.279 For Muslim marriages, jurisdiction lies first religious tribunals 
with recourse also available in civil courts (which are supposed to apply 
Islamic law).280 And for customary marriages, there is also a mixture of 
 
278 See Marriage Ordinance § 37 (“[N]othing in this Ordinance contained shall affect the 
validity of any marriage contracted under or in accordance with any native law or 
custom, or in any manner apply to marriages so contracted.”). See also EUGENE COTRAN,
RESTATEMENT OF AFRICAN LAW: KENYA, VOL. 1 (THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE) 1
(1968).  The most thorough recent rendering of the various Kenyan marriage laws lists six 
categories by  adding a separate category for “Cohabitation” (or common law marriage).  
See Catherine A. Hardee, Balancing Act:  The Rights of Women and Cultural Minorities in 
Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 712, 719-29 (2004).  For more on Kenya, see 
Laurence Juma, Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: Making a 
Case for Institutional Reformation and Revitalization of Customary Adjudication Process, 14 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 459 (2002); VICKY W. MUCAI-KATTAMBO ET AL., LAW AND THE STATUS OF 
WOMEN IN KENYA 5 (1995), available at http://www.ielrc.org/content/a9501.pdf; Mumbi 
Mathangani, Women’s Rights in Kenya: A Review of Government Policy, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
179, 183 (1995).   
279 Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 152 § 8 (1962).  For grounds of 
separation, see Subordinate Courts (Separation and Maintenance Ordinance), Laws of 
Kenya, CAP 153 (1962). 
280 Section 66 of the Kenyan Constitution provides for the establishment of Kadhi Courts 
(Islamic courts).  Section 5 of the Kadhi Courts Act provides that “[a] Kadhi’s court shall 
have an exercise the following jurisdiction, namely the determination of questions of 
Muslim law relating to personal statute, marriauge, divorce or inheritance in proceedings 
in which all the parties profess the Muslim religion….”  The Mohammedan Marriage, 
Divorce and Succession Ordinance § 3(2) also grants jurisdiction over Muslim marriages 
to the Supreme Court.  (“The Supreme Court and every judge thereof shall … have 
jurisdiction to hear and determine all matrimonial causes and suits arising out of 
Mohammedan marriages…”).  See also Ahmed Issack Hassan, Working Document for the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission on the Kadhi’s Courts, Chief Kadhi and Kadhis,
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availability of tribal authority and civil authority.281 
While a full detailing of the provisions of the various forms of 
marriage is not necessary here,282 a summary of the salient features of the 
various personal laws is still quite instructive. 
 
Civil Marriage/Divorce and Christianity. Marriage under Kenya’s 
Marriage Ordinance is “open to all persons irrespective of race or 
religion.”283 Civil marriage is monogamous, and entrants must meet certain 
requirements such as capacity and non-affinity.284 Further, there are other 
procedures such as banns, a proper ceremony (with two witnesses and an 
officiant, held at the proper time of day with proper vows), and 
registration.285 Somewhat curiously, civil marriages may occur either in the 
registrar’s office or in a church, and may be officiated either by a civil 
official or a minister.286 Couples married under the general civil marriage 
statute may divorce only for fault reasons, enumerated under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act.  These include adultery, desertion, cruelty, 
insanity, or rape/sodomy/bestiality.287 
African Christian Marriage is very closely related to civil marriage.   
It is only available to couples where at least one party is an African and a 
Christian; non-Christian couples must use some other religious law, 
customary law, or avail themselves of the regular civil marriage 
procedures.288 There is a separate governing statute regulating African 
Christian marriage, but effect of the statute is simply to relax a number of 
required formalities (such as longer registration periods, easier preliminary 
notice requirements, and the like).289 And there is no separate statute for  
 
available at http://www.kenyaconstitution.org/docs/07d046.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2005). 
281 See infra notes 307-309 and accompanying text. 
282 For a more fulsome explanation of the various forms of personal law in Kenya, see 
Hardee, supra note 278, at 719-29. 
283 COTRAN, supra note 278, at 1. 
284 Marriage Ordinance, § 11. 
285 Marriage Ordinance, §§ 3-18, 29, 32-34. 
286 Marriage Ordinance, §§ 3-7. 
287 Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 152 Part I (1962).  For grounds of 
separation and jurisdiction therein, see Subordinate Courts (Separation and Maintenance 
Ordinance), Laws of Kenya, CAP 153 (1962). 
288 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 3(1). 
289 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Ordinance.  See also Hardee, supra note 278, at 
723-24 and sources cited therein.  
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divorce; the Matrimonial Causes Act still governs.290 
There are two other distinguishing features of African Christian 
Marriage.  First, it explicitly provides for the conversion of customary 
marriages into Christian marriages.291 This is a unique feature of African 
Christian marriage, as no other marriages can be “converted” under 
statutory law.292 Second, the Ordinance provides additional protection for 
widows by forbidding the practice of widow inheritance (wherein a widow 
automatically becomes the wife of her deceased husband’s brother) and 
mandating that the widow become the guardian of the children of the 
marriage so long as she remains a Christian.293 
Islam.  Marriage and divorce law for Kenyan Muslims is codified, 
but exhibits a great amount of deference to Islamic law generally.294 The 
Muslim Ordinance states that Muslim marriages are valid if contracted in 
accordance with Islamic law, and further states that questions of validity 
and divorce shall be governed by Islamic law.  The Ordinance does not 
define the nature of that law, except to state that the burden of proof is on 
the party alleging that a practice is in accordance with Islamic law.295 This 
allows room for polygamy, non-judicial divorce, and other grounds of 
dissolution as defined by Islamic law generally.296 The Muslim Ordinance 
does require reporting by the parties to a Registrar of Mohammaden 
Marriages and Divorces.297 Jurisdiction in Muslim divorce cases lies both 
with Islamic courts (Kadhis courts) and civil courts – although the civil 
court is bound to apply Islamic law in relevant cases.298 
Hinduism. Marriage and divorce for Hindus bears many 
similarities to African Christian Marriage and the civil Marriage 
Ordinance.  The prime governing law is the Hindu Marriage and Divorce 
 
290 COTRAN, supra note 278, at 2-4. 
291 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 9. 
292 See Hardee, supra note 278, at 724. 
293 African Christian Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 13; see also Hardee, supra note  
278, at 724. 
294 Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP. 156 
(1962). 
295 Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance §§ 2-3. 
296 See infra notes 211-224 and accompanying text (discussing Islamic law of divorce). 
297 Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce and Succession Ordinance § 9. 
298 See supra note 280. 
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Ordinance,299 which is “largely based on the Hindu Marriage Act of 
India.”300 The Ordinance expressly provides that marriages under that 
Ordinance may only be between two Hindus301 – thereby requiring 
marriages to be monogamous (and consequently disallowing the 
traditional Hindu practice of polygamy).302 The Hindu Ordinance allows 
for some variation and allowance to custom regarding marriage 
formation, and similarly provides regulation regarding entrance to 
marriage (capacity, registration, and the like).303 
Divorce under the Hindu Ordinance is effectively limited to judicial 
divorce for cause.304 Like African Christian Marriage, it operates under 
the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (and also the Subordinate Courts 
(Separation and Maintenance) Ordinance provided there is no conflict 
with the Hindu Ordinance.305 The Hindu Ordinance adds three additional 
fault grounds for divorce: religious conversion by the spouse; the spouse’s 
entering a religious order; or judicial separation for two or more years.306 
Customary Law. Outside of the statutory systems of marriage and 
divorce described immediately above, Kenya’s laws expressly provide for 
recognition of traditional, customary (or tribal) marriages.307 The laws 
regarding customary marriage and divorce vary from tribe to tribe, with 
jurisdiction generally exercised by the Elders of community.  Customary 
marriage is potentially polygamous, depending the custom of any 
particular tribe.308 Of further interest is that when customary marriages 
break down, divorce matters are typically first heard by the tribal Elders.  
If the dispute rises to the level of the civil judicial system, the civil courts 
 
299 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance, Laws of Kenya, CAP 157 (1962). 
300 COTRAN, supra note 278, at 5. 
301 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 2. 
302 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance §§ 3(a), 7(3). 
303 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance §§ 3, 5, 6. 
304 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 10. 
305 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance §§ 9, 7(5). 
306 Hindu Marriage and Divorce Ordinance § 10(1). 
307 See Marriage Ordinance § 37 (“[N]othing in this Ordinance contained shall affect the 
validity of any marriage contracted under or in accordance with any native law or 
custom, or in any manner apply to marriages so contracted.”).  See also Mohammedan 
Marriage, Divorce, and Succession Ordiance § 6 (stating that a preexising customary 
marriage is a bar to entering a Muslim marriage). 
308 See Hardee, supra note 278, at 727-28.  See also Juma, supra note 278, at 469, 477-85 
(describing the evolution of customary African law). 
2006] MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE 53 
 
are directed to apply the customary law of the parties.309 Because of the 
reliance on custom as the driving force, there is no system for registration 
of marriage, for reporting of marriage or divorces, or for handing down 
decisions of local tribunals regarding personal law matters. 
 
C. South Africa 
 
While current personal law in India and Kenya mainly continues 
pre-existing structures alongside, there is still some movement and 
tendency in both countries toward unifying the law.  That is not the case 
in South Africa – which is, instead, explicitly attempting to establish multi-
tiered personal laws and jurisdictional structures to protect religious and 
minority rights. 
South Africa’s history is part of the driving force behind the 
institutional recognition of multi-tiered personal laws.  A former colony of 
the Dutch (1652) and then the British (1795), South Africa united in 1910 – 
and began the policy of separation that characterized it for most of the 
twentieth century.310 The exclusion of black South Africans (and others) 
from the political process under the system of apartheid has left an 
indelible and lasting impact on the current nation.  The first multi-racial 
election was held in 1994, when Nelson Mandela was elected President.  
The current Constitution was ratified in 1996.  That Constitution, and 
subsequent law-making, have consciously taken South Africa’s history 
into account and have tried to ensure minority rights and equality, in part 
by preserving customary and religious practices of all systems.  This has 
laid the groundwork for a multi-tiered personal law system. 
Under apartheid, there was a two-fold system of courts with 
jurisdiction over personal law matters, as black South Africans were 
subjected to a separate (and inferior) court system.311 During the 1990’s, 
tribal divorce courts were conclusively abolished and jurisdiction over 
 
309 See Hardee, supra note 278, at 727-28.  Hardee also discusses a category of 
“Cohabitation” (or common law marriages), which are beyond the scope of our 
discussion here.  See id. at 728-29. 
310 For a general and complete history of South Africa, see LEONARD THOMPSON, A
HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 31-32 (3rd ed. 2001); FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, SOUTH AFRICA: A COUNTRY STUDY 1-86 (Rita M. Byrnes, ed., 3rd ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter “Byrnes”]; RODNEY DAVENPORT & CHRISTOPHER SAUNDERS, SOUTH AFRICA:
A MODERN HISTORY (5th ed. 2000).  
311 See T. W. BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 139-50 (2004). 
54 LAW REVIEW [Vol. xx 
 
divorce matters was transferred to the newly-formed family courts.312 
Appeals from the family courts are to the High courts, and appeals from 
the High courts are to the Supreme Court of Appeal.313 Today, customary 
tribal courts do not have power to issue binding decisions in marital 
disputes, although they retain mediation authority.314 
While there was duality in personal law under apartheid, it was 
carried forward in a way that continued to subjugate the black South 
African populace and continued to relegate them to second-class status.  
With the advent of the new Constitution and subsequent laws, there is a 
recognition not just of alternative systems of marriages, but an intentional 
legal movement to accord equal status to those different personal law 
regimes.  The two currently statutorily recognized forms of marriage and 
divorce law are civil (Christian) marriage and customary marriage.  But 
there is also increasing discussion of passing legislation regarding Muslim 
marriages as well, and maybe others (such as Hinduism).315 
Civil/Christian Marriage. The laws relevant to civil and Christian 
marriage are the Marriage Act (1961)316 and the Divorce Act (1979).317 
Civil marriage in South Africa is similar to marriage in the United 
States.318 Under the Divorce Act, couples may petition for divorce in a 
 
312 Magistrates Courts Amendment Act of 1993, Act No. 120 of 1993. See also South Africa; 
Divorce Fever Hits City Court, Africa News, Nov. 17, 2003 (stating that family courts are 
less expensive and quicker than the previous system).  If there is no family court in the 
area, jurisdiction lies with the High court.  Divorce Act No. 70 of 1979; Customary 
Marriages Act No. 120 of 1998 § 1(i). 
313 See http://www.capegateway.gov.za/afr/pubs/public_info/C/32303/E.  (Appeals 
dealing with Constitutional matters would proceed from the High Court to the 
Constitution Court which is the final say on all Constitutional matters.  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal is the highest court for non-Constitutional matters.) 
314 See BENNETT, supra note 311, at 143 (explaining that traditional rulers also retained 
jurisdiction over claims for return of lobolo and actions for damages for adultery if 
customary law is applicable). 
315 As discussed below, there is also a recognition in the civil law that Jewish law has 
special problems operating under the state system because of the potential non-issuance 
of a get. Therefore, the Divorce Act of 1979 was amended in 1996 to add a requirement 
that religious divorce must be granted before civil divorce may be granted.  Divorce Act 
No. 70 (1979) § 5A. 
316 Act No. 25 of 1961. 
317 Act No. 70 of 1979. 
318 See David L. Chambers, Civilizing the Natives: Marriage in Post-Apartheid South Africa,
DAEDALUS 101, 103 (Fall 2000). 
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High Court or a family court.319 The only available grounds for divorce 
are (1) irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and (2) the mental illness 
or the continuous unconsciousness of a party to the marriage.320 
Irretrievable breakdown grounds may be founded upon adultery, 
separation for one year or more, or imprisonment of the defendant – all 
evidence that the “marriage has reached such a state of disintegration that 
there is no reasonable prospect of the restoration of a normal marriage 
relationship between [the couple].”321 
Under the old South African government, there was a very clear 
preference in the law for the civil/Christian form of marriage over 
customary marriages.  Civil/Christian marriage was the form practiced by 
white South Africans.322 If a couple married by civil or Christian rites—
that is, if they married in one of the established churches323 or a civil 
registry office – the common law applied to their marriage.324 Black South 
Africans retained a choice to marry either under civil law or their 
customary law, but civil/Christian marriages were considered superior to 
customary marriages.325 For example, if the couple chose to combine 
civil/Christian ceremonies with traditional ceremonies, the marriage 
would be governed by common law because the law presumed 
dominance of the civil/ Christian marriage over the customary 
elements.326 This distinction matters less after the 1998 passage of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, but there is still a presumption 
in the law that the civil or Christian ceremony is the default, with common 
law then governing such matters.327 
319 Divorce Act § 1. 
320 Divorce Act §§ 3-5. 
321 Divorce Act § 4.  
322 See Chambers, supra note 318, at 103. 
323 Cf. BENNETT, supra note 311, at 57 n. 176 (stating that marriages celebrated in 
independent African churches had no legal effect). 
324 See id.  at 57. 
325 See id. at 60; Chambers, supra note 318, at 103. 
326 See BENNETT, supra note 311, at 58.  Further, until recently a spouse in a customary 
marriage could marry in a civil/Christian ceremony and nullify any previously existing 
customary union, and in suits by dependants for damages from the death of a 
breadwinner, the claim would fail because the union went unrecognized.  See id. at 190-
91. 
327 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (1998) produced a more uniform code of 
marriage law with almost no possibility of conflict because “the consequences will be the 
same whether the unions were celebrated by customary or civil/Christian rites.”  Id. at 
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Customary Marriage. In the early 20th century, South Africa 
recognized customary marriages after the passage of the Native 
Administration Act (1927).  As mentioned above, though, customary 
marriages were still given inferior status at law.  During the colonial 
period through this time, five salient features typically distinguished 
customary unions from the otherwise prevailing civil model of marriage:  
(1) customary marriages permitted polygamy;328 (2) the validity of the 
customary union depended upon lobolo;329 (3) the relationship in a 
customary union was between two families, rather than two individuals; 
(4) the customary union was achieved gradually over time, rather than 
through a single ceremony; and (5) the customary marriage was a private 
affair that needed no intervention by civil or religious authorities.330 
In 1996, the Bill of Rights in the new Constitution granted 
Parliament the right to pass legislation “recognizing marriages concluded 
under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law.”331 It 
 
70.  However there are some times, as when a husband wants to take a second wife, when 
there must be a decision whether the civil/Christian marriage should be given 
precedence or the customary marriage should.  Therefore, if a couple performed both 
civil/Christian and customary rites, the civil/Christian form of marriage will still prevail. 
 This hints at the former prejudice against customary marriages, but it also gives wives 
greater protections by favoring monogamous unions.  Id. at 236-38. 
328 The potentially polygamous nature of customary marriage was a major reason for its 
inferior treatment by those in power.  See Johan D. van der Vyver, State Sponsored 
Proselytization:  A South African Experience, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 779, 832 (2000). 
329 Lobolo is the practice wherein the groom and his family enter into highly stylized 
negotiations with the parents of the bride and agree on an amount of bridewealth; the 
groom then pays the lobolo to the bride’s parents.  (The Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act § 1(iv) (1998) defines lobolo as “the property in cash or in kind, whether 
known as lobolo, bohali, xuma, lumalo, thaka, ikhazi, magadi, emabheka or by any other 
name, which a prospective husband or the head of his family undertakes to give to the 
head of the prospective wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage.”).  See 
Chambers, supra note 318, at 103; BENNETT, supra note 311, at 236-42. 
330 See BENNETT, supra note 311, at 188. 
331 South African Const. § 15(3)(a)(i); BENNETT, supra note 311, at 192.  Section 15 of the 
Constitution, 1996, states, in full: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, 
belief and opinion. 
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided 
institutions, provided that:  a. those observances follow rules made by 
the appropriate public authorities; b. they are conducted on an equitable 
basis; and c. attendance at them is free and voluntary. 
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further gave the government a duty to eradicate laws discriminating 
against customary marriages in order to encourage religious and cultural 
diversity.  To this end the South African Law Commission’s Special 
Project Committee on Customary Law332 began to investigate reform of 
customary law, with the goals of implementing the Bill of Rights and 
promoting African legal heritage.333 The Committee submitted its Report 
on Customary Marriages, and Parliament agreed to nearly all of its 
recommendations culminating in passage of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriages Act (RCMA) in 1998.334 
The main purposes of the RCMA are to give full recognition to 
existing customary marriages and to stipulate requirements for future 
customary marriages.335 Further, the RCMA intentionally moves beyond 
past discrimination in favor of civil/Christian marriages by according full 
legal status to customary marriages.  In the words of Deputy Justice 
Minister Cheryl Gillwald at the inception of the RCMA on November 15, 
2000:  The Act “brings to an end the tyranny of dictatorial recognition of 
 
(3)  a. This section does not prevent legislation recognizing:  i. marriages 
concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or 
family law; or ii. Systems of personal and family law under any tradition, 
or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion.  b. Recognition 
in terms of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the 
other provisions of the Constitution. 
South African Const. § 15 (1996). 
332 The South African Law Commission is an advisory body which conducts research in 
order to bring South African Law in line with the Constitution.  “Because of the lengthy, 
orderly, and democratic process that the [South African Law Commission] goes through 
with regard to law reform, the South African Government gives strong deference to their 
legislative recommendations.”  Andrew P. Kult, Intestate Succession in South Africa:  The 
“Westernization” of Customary Law Practices Within a Modern Constitutional Framework, 11 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 697, 712-714 (2001). 
333 See BENNETT, supra note 311, at 193. 
334 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (1998).  See also BENNETT, supra note 311, at 
194; Kult, supra note 332, at 717-718. 
335 See Kult, supra note 332, at 718; BENNETT, supra note 311, at 194.  The preamble to the 
RCMA reads, “To make provision for the recognition of customary marriages; to specify 
the requirements for a valid customary marriage; to regulate the registration of 
customary marriages; to provide for the equal status and capacity of spouses in 
customary marriages; to regulate the proprietary consequences of customary marriages 
and the capacity of spouses of such marriages; to regulate the dissolution of customary 
marriages; to provide for the making of regulations; to repeal certain provisions of certain 
laws; and to provide for matters connected therwith.”  Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act, preamble (1998). 
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civil and other Eurocentric faith-based marriages at the expense of 
marriages concluded in accordance with customary law.”336 
The RCMA defines “customary marriage” as “a marriage 
concluded in accordance with customary law.”337 And customary law is 
defined as “the customs and usages traditionally observed among the 
indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the 
culture of those peoples.”338 There are two statutory requirements for a 
customary marriage to be valid:  (1) Both prospective spouses must be at 
least eighteen years old and must consent to be married to each other 
under customary law, and (2) “the marriage must be negotiated and 
entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary law.”339 Because 
there is no single definition of customary law applicable to all black South 
Africans,340 the openness of the RCMA’s definition of customary marriage 
provides for a wide variation in practices in custom.  Even so, there are a 
few common characteristics of customary marriage formation.  For 
example, usually a couple is considered married by their customary or 
tribal community group only after the completion of a lengthy process; 
there is not a once-in-time ceremony as in civil or Christian marriages.  
The customary process usually includes payment of all or part of lobolo (a 
bride price), performance of some kind of (widely varying) ceremonies, 
and, for some groups, a period of cohabitation or birth of a child.341 
Under the RCMA, lobolo has effectively become a contractual accessory to 
marriage, with its payment typically signifying that a union is a 
customary form of marriage.342 Many South Africans are still strongly 
attached to the practice, as it stands as a “symbol that the wife is valued, 
as a mark of the bond between families, as compensation to the bride’s 
parents for the cost and effort to raise her, and, today, as a symbol of 
continuity with African traditions.”343 
336 Keynote address by the Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional developments, 
Ms. Cheryl Gillwald, MP, at the Launch of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
No. 120 of 1998, November 15, 2000. 
337 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 1(iii); Kult, supra note 332, at 718. 
338 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 1(ii); Kult, supra note 332, at 718. 
339 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 3(1). 
340 See Chuma Himonga, Transforming Customary Law of Marriage in South Africa and the 
Challenges of Its Implementation with Specific Reference to Matrimonial Property, 32 INT’L J. 
LEGAL INFO. 260, 264 (2004). 
341 See Chambers, supra note 318, at 103-104. 
342 See BENNETT, supra note 311, at 236. 
343 See id. at 235; Chambers, supra note 318, at 104. 
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One of the main purposes of the RCMA was to set up a system of 
registration for customary marriages and divorces.344 It imposes a duty 
on the spouses to ensure their marriage is registered, but failure to register 
does not affect the validity of the marriage.345 The RCMA did alter the 
customary law including the addition of age and consent requirements 
and the grant to spouses equal status and capacity,346 but it did not abolish 
polygamy.347 A husband who wishes to enter an additional customary 
marriage must simply apply to the court to “approve a written contract 
which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his 
marriages.”348 This is supposed to ensure the fair treatment of the first 
wife/wives and will vary according to the property system that governs 
the marriage.349 
One very big change in the RCMA is the process and grounds for 
divorce.  Whereas dissolution of marriage under customary law was 
traditionally handled by the families or the local community, the RCMA 
codified the grounds for divorce – which are essentially the same as 
civil/Christian divorce and governed by the Divorce Act (1979).350 Thus, 
the codification of customary marriage law has had the dual effect of 
legitimizing the status of customary marriage (by according it equal status 
with civil/Christian marriage) but also altering it (by requiring that 
marriage registration and all of divorce proceed through civil channels). 
 
Muslim Marriage.  Just as customary marriages were initially 
disfavored (and not recognized legally) in South Africa because of their 
potentially polygamous nature, so too were Muslim and Hindu marriages 
disfavored.  But while the RCMA has given customary marriages full 
 
344 Kult, supra note 332, at 718. 
345 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 4 (1), (9). 
346 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 6; BENNETT, supra note 311, at 199; 
Himonga, supra note 340, at 264. 
347 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 2(3)-(4) (stating that all existing 
polygamous marriages were recognized as marriages at the commencement of the Act, 
and that all future polygamous marriages will be recognized as marriages if they comply 
with the provisions of the Act). 
348 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 7(6).  
349 All pre-existing marriages will continue to be ruled by the property system of 
customary law, and marriages entered into after the commencement of the Act are in 
community of property unless the spouses opt out with an ante-nuptial contract.  
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 7(1)-(2). 
350 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 8.  See also BENNETT, supra note 311, at 266. 
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recognition, Muslim and Hindu marriages have still not been obtained 
statutory status.351 As it did with customary marriage, the South African 
Law Commission has been in the process of investigating Islamic 
Marriage.  Since 1999, the Commission has published several documents 
related to Islamic marriages, 352 culminating in a July 2003 Report and 
attached draft bill on Muslim marriages.353 To date, this proposal has not 
been passed into law. 
 The Report and draft bill do not propose to eliminate polygamy 
entirely,354 but a spouse in a Muslim marriage may not subsequently 
marry under any other law during the subsistence of the Muslim 
marriage.355 Unlike the other forms of marriage in South Africa, Muslim 
marriage would automatically be out of community of property.356 Like 
the requirement for entering a subsequent customary marriage, if the 
husband wishes to marry again, he must apply to the court for a contract 
for the future regulation of matrimonial property in his marriages.357 The 
court “must grant approval if it is satisfied that the husband is able to 
maintain equality between his spouses as is prescribed by the Holy 
Qur’an.”358 Polygamy without permission of the court is punishable by a 
fine of up to R20,000.359 
The draft bill also makes some changes to the husband’s rights to 
irrevocable talaq. The divorce must be registered in the magisterial district 
closest to the wife’s residence in the presence of the wife and two 
witnesses within thirty days of pronouncement.360 Further, a spouse must 
then institute legal proceeding within fourteen days of registration for a 
decree confirming dissolution of marriage by Talaq.361 This registration 
and divorce procedure is a substantial deviation from the traditional form 
 
351 Van der Vyver, , supra note 328, at 837; Rashida Manjoo, Legislative Recognition of 
Muslim Marriages in South Africa, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 271, 273 (2004). 
352 Manjoo, supra note 351, at 274.  These documents include an Issue Paper (May 2000), a 
Discussion Paper (Dec. 2001), a Bill (Oct. 2002), and an amended draft Bill (July 2003). 
353 See South African Law Reform Commission, Project 59, Islamic Marriages and Related 
Matters Report, July 2003  (hereinafter Report). 
354 Draft Bill § 8(6). 
355 Draft Bill § 5(2). 
356 Draft Bill § 8(1). 
357 Draft Bill § 8(6). 
358 Draft Bill § 8(6)(a). 
359 Draft Bill § 8(11). 
360 Draft Bill § 9(3)(a). 
361 Draft Bill § 9(3)(f). 
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of talaq divorce, for the traditional form was strictly a private matter and 
the draft bill purports to put jurisdiction in the hand of the civil authority. 
Specifically, the draft bill provides that Muslim divorce will be under the 
same jurisdiction as other systems of marriage—the jurisdiction of the 
High Courts or family courts with appeals to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals.362 However, the court will be assisted in an advisory capacity by 
two Muslim assessors who have specialized knowledge of Islamic law.363 
Appeals must be submitted to two Muslim institutions for written 
comment on questions of law within sixty days, and the Supreme Court of 
Appeals will give due regard to the written comments.364 Thus, the result 
will be that the civil court system will be applying Islamic law – albeit 
with deference to the interpretation of religious authorities.  Finally, if the 
parties have a civil marriage and want to dissolve it, the court will not 
grant the civil divorce until it is satisfied that the accompanying Muslim 
marriage has been dissolved.365 
D. Other Exemplars 
 
As the above examples demonstrate, there are multiple possible 
conceptions of the proper jurisdictional relationship between civil and 
religious authorities regarding marriage and divorce law.  And India, 
Kenya, and South Africa certainly do not exhaust the reservoir of possible 
comparative examples.  Nor do they exhaust the possible number of 
options for structuring such relationship.366 
For example, one could look to Israel for a variation on governance 
of personal law matters.  Israel’s personal law is administered primarily 
by religious tribunals – in direct descent from the millet system of the 
Ottoman Empire.367 Thus, rabbinical courts govern marriage and divorce 
law for all Jews, and other “religious courts” govern personal law for 
adherents of other faiths.368 But a limited number of religious groups are 
 
362 Draft Bill § 15(1) and (3) 
363 Draft Bill § 15(1)(b) and (2). 
364 Draft Bill § 15(4)-(5). 
365 Draft Bill § 16(1). 
366 See, e.g., SHACHAR, supra note 14 at 88-113 (discussing a variety of models of possible 
“shared jurisdiction”). 
367 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 121.  See also  notes 44-47 and accompanying 
text. 
368 See id. at 122; Alan Reed, Transnational Non-Judicial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of 
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recognized, and there is not a residual category of secular civil law in 
some areas (marriage, for example), and this presents potential hardships 
for those outside the recognized religious groups.369 Israel maintains 
some control over the religious tribunals by requiring a right to appeal – 
both within and without the respective religious legal systems.  But the 
secular civil courts do not have authority to reverse an error in applying 
religious law; rather their appellate jurisdiction is limited to other matters 
such as jurisdictional issues, procedural rules, natural law principles, and 
precedent.370 This presents challenges for this system of law, as does the 
additional notion that all Jews are under the same rabbinical court system 
which is controlled by the Orthodox movement.371 While this has led 
some commentators to suggest that the religious court system “as it 
currently exists in Israel may actually hinder, rather than aid, religious 
autonomy,”372 Israel’s approach provides another alternative for thinking 
intentionally about religious rights and minority rights in personal law 
matters. 
Or Egypt could alternately be adduced as a structural possibility, 
for it permits the laws of Islam, Christianity, or Judaism to govern 
marriage and divorce law over adherents of those faiths.373 
Or, closer to home, we could learn from the ongoing discussions 
and debates within our northern neighbor, Canada, regarding religious 
pluralism.  In Canada, the model has not been direct co-opting and 
 
Recognition Under English and U.S. Jurisprudence, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 311, 328 
(1996). 
369 See Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Israel, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 
462-64 (1998).  Cf. S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration of 
Secular and Spiritual Law Affects Human rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 109, 139 (1997) (discussing the possibility for divorce in civil courts for members 
of unrecognized religious communities, even though such persons cannot be married in 
civil courts).  
370 See Reed, supra note 368, at 499-500. 
371 See generally Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 154, at 122-27.  See also Lapidoth, supra 
note 369, at 463-64; Strong, supra note 369, at 156, 158. 
372 Reed, supra note 368, at 501. 
373 See EL ALAMI, supra note 202, at 6 (“[In Egypt,] [t]he issues of marriage and divorce 
have remained regulated by religious principles and are therefore subject to the rulings of 
the Shari’ah. Christian and Jewish rulings are likewise applied to similar issues amongst 
those groups respectively.”).  See also ESPOSITO, supra note 214, at 49-61 (describing 
reforms in Muslim law of marriage and divorce in Egypt); ENID HILL, MAHKAMA!
STUDIES IN THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, COURTS & CRIMES, LAW & SOCIETY 72- 101 (1979) 
(discussing nuances of divorce – especially under Islamic law – in Egypt). 
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enforcement of religious law by the state itself, but rather a reliance on 
firm notions of contract such that individuals could “opt” into an arbitral 
board of their choosing to resolve disputes – including a religious arbitral 
board with binding authority.374 
Legislators in Ontario passed the Arbitration Act of 1991 to provide 
an alternative to settling disputes within the court system.375 The Act 
allowed the parties to choose the law under which the arbitration would 
be conducted.376 According the Attorney General’s interpretation of the 
situation, the original intent of the drafters was that this choice of law 
provision would allow the parties to choose from any of the provincial 
laws; however, the plain language of the statute was accepted, and that 
intent of the drafters was ignored.377 This meant that in practice, 
Christians, Jews, Muslims, and people of other faith traditions could 
arbitrate their disputes according to the principles of their faith.378 In 
addition, the Act required Ontario courts to “uphold arbitrators’ decisions 
if both sides enter the process voluntarily and if results are fair, equitable, 
and do not violate Canadian law.”379 
The system enacted by the Arbitration Act of 1991 functioned 
 
374 Without venturing too far afield, it seems that the Canadian model probably comes the 
closest to what might be constitutional, permissible, and most in line with American 
notions of the common structure of the marital relationship.  If marriage is primarily seen 
as a contract at American law, there is a cogent argument to be made that parties ought to 
be free to use the formalities of contract law to enter into both heightened contractual 
requirements and an alternative adjudicator of any future disputes.  Judicial review could 
then be had of arbitral decisions, as such decisions are currently reviewed (with great 
deference). 
375 Arbitration Act, S.O., ch. 17 (1991) (Can.).  Private arbitration was also legal prior to 
1992 in the previous Arbitration Act, and “family matters have been arbitrated based on 
religious teachings for many years in Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Settings.”  Marion 
Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting Inclusion, 4 (2004), 
available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf.  
376 Arbitration Act, S.O., ch. 17, 32(1) (1991) (Can.) (“In deciding a dispute, an arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law designated by the parties….”) 
377 See Boyd, supra note 375 at 12; Marie Egan Provins, Constructing an Islamic Institute of 
Civil Justice that Encourages Women’s Rights, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 515, 520 
(2005). 
378 See Provins, supra note 377, at 520. 
379 Arbitration Act, S.O., ch. 17, 34, 46 (1991) (Can.); Carol Lowes, Islamic Board Gets Green 
Light, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, March 2004 at 22, available at 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/003/17.22.html.  
64 LAW REVIEW [Vol. xx 
 
without problem until the fall of 2003 when Syed Mumtaz Ali announced 
that the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) had been established “to 
ensure that Islamic principles of family and inheritance law could be used 
to resolve disputes within the Muslim community in Canada.”380 Mumtaz 
Ali’s statements to the media about the IICJ created public concern that 
Ontario had granted special rights to Sharia Courts to settle disputes 
between Muslims.  Although religious arbitrations had been in practice 
for years, the IICJ and the publicity surrounding its establishment brought 
new attention, and citizens and citizens’ groups brought their concerns to 
the Ontarian government which authorized the Attorney General, Marion 
Boyd to investigate the current system of arbitration.381 That investigation 
eventually led to a 2004 report endorsing the continued use of arbitration 
as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism in family law with certain 
recommendations for improvement.382 
The report was not received with great favor, and in spite of the 
attorney general’s endorsement, Ontario recently passed an amendment 
to the Arbitration Act that put an end to arbitration of family law matters 
under religious principles.  In September 2005, Premier Dalton McGuinty 
made a surprise announcement during a phone interview that “[t]here 
will be no sharia law in Ontario.  There will be no religious arbitration in 
Ontario.  There will be one law for all Ontarians.”383 This position came to 
fruition with the passage of Bill 27 on February 23, 2006, which amended 
the Arbitration Act of 1991.  The bill amended section 32 of the Arbitration 
Act so that instead of allowing disputes to be decided under “the rules of 
law designated by the parties,” the amended act states that “[i]n a family 
 
380 See Boyd, supra note 375, at 3. 
381 See id. at 3-6. 
382 See Marion Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protecting Choice, Promoting 
Inclusion: Executive Summary (2004), available at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesumma
ry.pdf; Provins at 524.  Boyd’s recommendations generally called for more government 
involvement to oversee and evaluate arbitration, education and training for arbitrators, 
education for the public about the arbitration process, and the requirement that the 
parties to arbitrations obtain independent legal advice.  See generally Boyd, Executive 
Summary; Provins, supra note 377, at 524-25. 
383 See Prithi Yelaga and Robert Benzie, McGuinty: No Sharia Law, TORONTO STAR,
September 12, 2005 at A1.  Quebec has taken the same position about Muslim law.  While 
Ontario was still debating its use, lawmakers in Quebec “unanimously rejected use of 
Islamic tribunals in its legal system.”  Les Perreaux, Quebec Rejects Islamic Law, CANADIAN 
PRESS, May 27, 2005 at A8. 
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arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the substantive law of Ontario, 
unless the parties expressly designate the substantive law of another 
Canadian jurisdiction, in which case that substantive law shall be 
applied.”384 This effectively cut off not only the rights of Muslims to settle 
disputes in family matters under Islamic law, but eliminated the rights of 
other religious traditions as well, including the rabbinic courts present 
and practicing in Ontario since 1889.385 
As these and other comparative examples show, there are a wide 
range of possible approaches to multi-tiered marriage.  Many of these are 
already being practiced elsewhere.  That is not to say that there is 
necessarily a ready panacea in some other country that can be easily 
adapted to the American experience.  But it would be provincial and 
parochial – and possibly even foolhardy – to fail to look for other sources of 
wisdom besides our own at a moment of crisis (and opportunity) in 
marriage and divorce law. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the midst of a national debate about the meaning and definition of 
marriage, we would be well-served to acknowledge that our multiplicity of 
citizens is unlikely to agree on a singular answer.  This leads to two at least 
possible conclusions – either (1) rule by majoritarian voice or (2) allow for 
variation in understandings of marriage and divorce.  In recent times, the 
first option has been the dominant theme at American law.  But there are 
signs – in Louisiana, New York, and elsewhere – that we may be willing to 
consider recognizing our pluralism and reifying that into law.  There are 
historical antecedents for recognizing different models of marriage and 
divorce jurisdiction.  There are also strong examples from comparative 
international law that can serve as guides (as well as warnings, if need be). 
 Moving toward multi-tiered marriage need not mean – indeed, 
should not mean – that we must abandon protections for women and 
 
384 Family Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. c.1, 32 (2006) (Can.), available at 
http://www.ontla.on.ca/Library/bills/382/27382.htm. In addition, the explanatory note 
to the amendment states that “[t]he term ‘family arbitration’ is applied only to processes 
conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of Ontario or of another Canadian 
jurisdiction.  Other third-party decision-making processes in family matters are not 
family arbitrations and have no legal effect.  Id. 
385 See Ron Csillag, Jewish Groups Say New Bill Targets Beit Dins, CANADIAN JEWISH NEWS,
at 5. 
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children that we have assiduously worked to implement.  Nor should it 
mean that the state must sanction actions and behavior that will undermine 
core values of equality.  But it is unnecessary for the state to retain sole 
jurisdictional control over a unitary, least common denominator system of 
marriage and divorce law.  If capable and competent parties desire to enter 
more binding unions under the auspices of their religious traditions, they 
should be free to do so.  If religious communities desire to draw upon their 
own theological and legal resources to aid in governing their adherents, 
they should be able to do so.  We may well be seeing the bellwethers of 
multi-tiered marriage in current state laws.  We may be well seeing a 
rediscovery of some of own history of shared or complementary jurisdiction 
over family law.  And we may well be seeing alternate ways to implement 
multi-tiered marriage through the examples of other nations in the 
international community. 
